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ABSTRACT
In a frictionless world, investment is perfectly elastic to changes in the discount rate. With financial
frictions, investment is less elastic, meaning that a given magnitude of change in investment is associated
with a higher magnitude of change in the discount rate. Equivalently, investment is a more powerful
predictor of future stock returns. Consistent with this prediction, we document that the asset growth,
external finance, and accrual anomalies in the cross-section of stock returns are much stronger in financially
more constrained firms than in financially less constrained firms. Further tests show that this effect
of financial constraints is distinct from the effect of financial distress and the effect of limits of arbitrage
on the magnitude of the anomalies.
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Capital markets anomalies are empirical relations between average stock returns and ﬁrm charac-
teristics, relations that cannot be explained by the Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM). Over the past two decades, anomalies have become increasingly important
for estimating expected returns in asset allocation and investment management and for estimat-
ing costs of capital in capital budgeting and security valuation. And understanding the economic
sources of anomalies is one of the most important questions in capital markets research.
We study how ﬁnancial constraints aﬀect the magnitude of capital markets anomalies. Our
main message is that the asset growth, external ﬁnance, and accrual anomalies tend to be stronger
in ﬁnancially more constrained ﬁrms than in ﬁnancially less constrained ﬁrms.
Using bond ratings to measure ﬁnancial constraints, we ﬁnd that in the unconstrained subsam-
ple consisting of ﬁrms whose corporate bonds are rated, the value-weighted average return, CAPM
alpha, and Fama-French (1993) three-factor alpha for the high-minus-low asset growth portfolio are
−0.32%,−0.45%, and −0.03% per month. These estimates are substantially lower in magnitude
than their counterparts, −0.72%,−0.79%, and −0.47%, respectively, in the constrained subsample
consisting of ﬁrms whose corporate bonds are not rated. And the diﬀerences across the constrained
and unconstrained subsamples are all more than 2.4 standard errors from zero. The basic results are
robust with respect to using equal-weighted returns and alternative ﬁnancial constraints measures.
The eﬀect of net stock issues (a measure of external ﬁnance) also is stronger in more con-
strained ﬁrms. The value-weighted average return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha of the
high-minus-low net stock issues portfolio are −0.48%,−0.63%, and −0.44% per month in the low
WW-index (least constrained) tercile. These estimates are more than halved in magnitude relative
to their counterparts, −1.34%,−1.60%, and −1.29%, respectively, in the high WW-index (most
constrained) tercile. And the diﬀerences across the extreme terciles are all more than 3.6 standard
errors from zero. The basic results are robust with respect to using equal-weighted returns and to
2using payout ratio or bond ratings to measure ﬁnancial constraints.
The accrual eﬀect is stronger in more constrained ﬁrms. The equal-weighted average return,
CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha of the high-minus-low accrual portfolio are −0.34%,−0.37%,
and −0.35% per month in the high payout ratio (least constrained) tercile, which are more than
halved in magnitude compared to their counterparts, −0.79%,−0.82%, and −0.75%, respectively,
in the low payout ratio (most constrained) tercile. The diﬀerences are more than 2.9 standard
errors from zero. Although going in the same direction, the value-weighted results are insigniﬁcant.
We motivate our empirical analysis within a simple q-theory model in the spirit of Cochrane
(1991). The economic intuition is fairly simple. In a frictionless world, investment is perfectly elas-
tic to changes in the discount rate, meaning that a small change in the discount rate is associated
with an inﬁnite magnitude of change in investment. With ﬁnancial frictions, investment entails
ﬁnancing costs, causing investment to be less elastic to changes in the discount rate. The more
ﬁnancially constrained a ﬁrm is, the less elastic the ﬁrm’s investment will be in response to changes
in the discount rate. Equivalently, the more ﬁnancially constrained the ﬁrm is, a given change
in investment of the ﬁrm will correspond to a higher magnitude of change in the discount rate,
meaning that investment is a more powerful predictor of future returns. This elasticity mechanism
applies to cross-sectional return predictability associated with asset growth, net stock issues, and
accruals because these variables are all closely connected with capital investment.
Financial constraints and ﬁnancial distress are diﬀerent, albeit related, concepts. Financial
constraints are frictions that prevent a ﬁrm from funding all desired investments, while ﬁnancial
distress is situations where cash ﬂow is insuﬃcient to cover current obligations. To disentangle
the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints from that of ﬁnancial distress, we study how the magnitude of
the anomalies varies across subsamples split jointly by measures of ﬁnancial constraints and ﬁnan-
cial distress. Using Ohlson’s (1980) O-score and Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi’s (2008) failure
probability to measure ﬁnancial distress, we ﬁnd that ﬁnancial distress does not subsume ﬁnancial
3constraints, but that ﬁnancial constraints often dominate ﬁnancial distress in our multivariate tests.
Another alternative hypothesis that we explore is the limits to arbitrage hypothesis. Anomalies
can persist if the costs of arbitrage outweigh the beneﬁts of arbitrage aimed to exploit the anomalies
(e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). This hypothesis predicts that anomalies should be stronger in
ﬁrms with more limits to arbitrage. Empirically, we ﬁnd that measures of ﬁnancial constraints are
indeed correlated with proxies for limits to arbitrage such as dollar trading volume and idiosyn-
cratic stock volatility. More important, although these proxies aﬀect the magnitude of anomalies,
their eﬀect does not subsume, and is often subsumed by, the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints.
Our work adds to the literature that explores the interaction between capital investment and
asset prices. Cochrane (1991) shows that investment is a strong predictor of stock market returns.
Cochrane (1996) uses returns on physical investment as factors to price the cross section of returns.
Lettau and Ludvigson (2002) use q-theory to study the impact of time-varying risk premiums on ag-
gregate investment. Anderson and Garcia-Feij´ oo (2006) document that investment growth classiﬁes
ﬁrms into size and book-to-market portfolios. Whited and Wu (2006) construct an index of ﬁnancial
constraints via structural estimation and ﬁnd that more constrained ﬁrms earn insigniﬁcantly higher
average returns than less constrained ﬁrms. Xing (2008) shows that an investment growth factor
can explain the value eﬀect as well as Fama and French’s (1993) value factor. Hahn and Lee (2009)
study the eﬀect of debt capacity on stock returns across constrained and unconstrained samples.
None of these papers examine the impact of ﬁnancial constraints on the magnitude of anomalies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We develop testable hypotheses in Section 2, de-
scribe our sample in Section 3, present main empirical results in Section 4, and conclude in Section 5.
2 Hypothesis Development
We ﬁrst derive the relation between ﬁnancial constraints and cross-sectional return predictabil-
ity associated with investment in a simple model. Based on the model’s predictions, we develop
4testable hypotheses to guide our subsequent empirical analysis.
2.1 A Simple q-theory Model with Costly External Finance
We incorporate costly external ﬁnance into the q-theory framework in the spirit of Cochrane (1991).
The model is deliberately designed to be conceptually simple and analytically tractable, but the
central economic insight should hold in more general settings.
There are two periods, 0 and 1, and heterogeneous ﬁrms, indexed by j. Firms use capital and
costlessly adjustable inputs to produce a perishable good. The levels of these inputs are chosen each
period to maximize the ﬁrms’ operating proﬁts, deﬁned as revenues minus the expenditures on these
inputs. Firm j’s operating proﬁts are given by πkj0 in period 0 and πkj1 in period 1, in which π is the
long-term average return on assets, which is time-invariant and constant across ﬁrms. Allowing π to
vary over time and across ﬁrms does not change the basic insights. kj0 and kj1 are ﬁrm j’s capital
in periods 0 and 1, respectively. The operating-proﬁts function exhibits constant returns to scale,
meaning that π is both the marginal product of capital and the average product of capital. Taking
the operating proﬁts as given, ﬁrms choose optimal investment to maximize their market value.
Firm j starts with capital stock, kj0, invests in period 0, and produces in both periods. Firm j
exits at the end of period 1 with a liquidation value of (1 − δ)kj1, in which δ is the rate of capital
depreciation. Capital evolves as kj1 = ij + (1 − δ)kj0, in which i is capital investment. We model
ﬁnancial constraints following Kaplan and Zingales (1997). When ﬁrm j’s investment demand, ij,
is higher than its internal funds, πkj0, we assume that the ﬁrm covers the shortfall with external
ﬁnance, ej, deﬁned as (ij − πkj0)χ{ij>πkj0}, in which χ{·} is an indicator function that takes the
value of one if the event described in { } is true, and otherwise takes the value of zero. When
raising external funds, ej > 0, the ﬁrm incurs quadratic ﬁnancing costs of (λ/2)(ej/kj0)2kj0. As
in Kaplan and Zingales, we use the constant parameter λ > 0 to capture the degree of ﬁnancial
constraints: Firms with higher λ are more constrained and ﬁrms with lower λ are less constrained.
The ﬁnancing-cost function is increasing and convex in ej and decreasing in kj0.
5Firm j has a gross discount rate, denoted rj. The discount rate varies across ﬁrms due to, for
example, ﬁrm-speciﬁc loadings on macroeconomic risk factors. The ﬁrm chooses kj1 to maximize













(πkj1 + (1 − δ)kj1)
The market value of ﬁrm j is the sum of period 0’s free cash ﬂow, πkj0 − ij − (λ/2)(ej/kj0)
2 kj0,
and the discounted value of date 1’s cash ﬂow, (πkj1 + (1 − δ)kj1)/rj. In this two-period setup,
the ﬁrm does not invest in the second period, meaning that date 1’s cash ﬂow is simply the sum
of the operating proﬁts and the liquidation value of the capital.
The tradeoﬀ of ﬁrm j when making investment decisions is simple: Foregoing free cash ﬂows
today in exchange for higher free cash ﬂows tomorrow. Setting the ﬁrst-order derivative of the
objective function with respect to kj1 to zero yields:
rj =
π + 1 − δ
1 + λ(ij/kj0 − π)χ{ij/kj0>π}
(1)
This optimality condition is intuitive. The numerator in the right-hand side of equation (1) is the
marginal beneﬁt of investment, π + 1 − δ, including the marginal product of capital, π, and the
marginal liquidation value of capital, 1 − δ. The denominator is the marginal cost of investment
that includes the marginal purchasing cost of investment, unity, and the marginal ﬁnancing cost,
λ(ij/kj0 − π), if the ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained (λ > 0 and ij/kj0 > π). Because the marginal
beneﬁt of investment is in date 1’s dollar terms and the marginal cost of investment is in date
0’s dollar terms, the optimality condition says that the marginal beneﬁt of investment, discounted
in date 0’s dollar terms, should be equal to the marginal cost of investment. Equivalently, the
investment return (the ratio of the marginal beneﬁt of investment divided by the marginal cost of
investment) should equal the discount rate, as in Cochrane (1991).
We are interested in knowing how λ aﬀects the investment eﬀect in cross-sectional returns. To
6simplify notations, we only analyze constrained ﬁrms with ij/kj0 > π. We can then drop the indica-






π + 1 − δ
[1 + λ(ij/kj0 − π)]
2 < 0 (2)
As such, investment predicts returns with a negative sign as in Cochrane (1991). And the magnitude
of ∂rj/∂ij captures the magnitude of the investment eﬀect. To see how this magnitude varies with










(π + 1 − δ)[1 − λ(ij/kj0 − π)]
kj0 [1 + λ(ij/kj0 − π)]
3 (3)
which is positive as long as 1 − λ(ij/kj0 − π) or 1 − λ(ej/kj0) > 0.
This condition is empirically plausible, as demonstrated in a simple back-of-the-envelope cal-
culation. The average investment-to-capital ratio is about 12% per annum or 1% per month.
Suppose 50% of the investment is ﬁnanced by external funds, the average new equity-to-capital
ratio is then 0.50% per month, meaning that 1 − λ(ej/kj0)>0 holds as long as λ<200 in monthly
frequency. This restriction is quite weak. With an average new equity-to-capital ratio of 0.50%,
λ=200 means that ﬁnancing costs are as high as 50% of the proceeds raised from external funds:
[(λ/2)(ej/kj0)2kj0]/ej = (λ/2)(ej/kj0) = (200/2) × 0.50% = 50%. In summary:
Central Prediction. Under weak conditions, the magnitude of the investment eﬀect
is stronger in more constrained ﬁrms than that in less constrained ﬁrms.
Figure 1 provides a numerical example of the economic mechanism at work. We let the
investment-to-capital ratio vary from 15% to 20% per annum with δ = 0 and π = 15% per annum.
We plot the monthly rj calculated from equation (1) against monthly ij/kj0 for three diﬀerent values
of λ: 0 (the solid line), 5 (the dashed line), and 10 (the dashdot line). The discount rate-investment
relation becomes steeper as we gradually increase the cost parameter of external ﬁnance, λ. In
particular, when ﬁrms are unconstrained ﬁnancially, λ = 0, the discount rate, rj, is ﬂat in ij/kj0.
7Figure 1 : The Discount Rate versus Investment-to-Capital in the Simple q-theory Model
We plot the discount rate, rj, against the investment-to-capital ratio, ij/kj0, based on the functional form:
rj =
π + 1 − δ
1 + λ(ij/kj0 − π)χ{ij/kj0>π}
We plot the relation for three values of the ﬁnancing cost parameter, λ: 0 (the solid line), 5 (the dashed line), and
10 (the dashdot line). We set π = 0.15/12 per month, δ = 0, and let ij/kj0 vary from 0.15/12 to 0.20/12 per month.



































The economic intuition is fairly simple. The partial derivative ∂rj/∂ij is the inverse of the elas-
ticity of investment with respect to changes in the discount rate. When investment is frictionless
(λ = 0), investment is inﬁnitely elastic to changes in the discount rate, meaning that rj is ﬂat in
ij/kj0. With ﬁnancial frictions (λ > 0), investment entails ﬁnancing costs, and higher investment
intensity entails higher ﬁnancing costs. As a result, investment is no longer inﬁnitely elastic to
changes in the discount rate. And the magnitude of this elasticity decreases with the ﬁnancing cost
parameter, λ. The higher λ is, the more inelastic investment will be with respect to changes in the
discount rate. Equivalently, the higher λ is, a given magnitude of change in investment will corre-
8spond to a higher magnitude of change in the discount rate, meaning that investment-to-capital is
a more powerful predictor of future returns.
2.2 Testable Hypotheses
Based on the model’s central prediction, we develop several testable hypotheses. A direct test of
the prediction is to check the magnitude of the investment eﬀect in cross-sectional returns across
subsamples split by measures of ﬁnancial constraints. We use three measures of ﬁnancial con-
straints including payout ratio, bond ratings, and the Whited-Wu (2006, WW) index (see Section
3.1 for detailed variable deﬁnitions). Firms with low payout ratios, unrated public debt, and high
WW-index values are more ﬁnancially constrained, and ﬁrms with high payout ratios, rated public
debt, and low WW-index values are less ﬁnancially constrained.
We connect the investment eﬀect in theory with three well-known anomalies in empirical capital
markets research: the asset growth anomaly, the external ﬁnance anomaly, and the accrual anomaly.
We view asset growth as the most comprehensive measure of investment intensity, in which invest-
ment is simply the change in total assets, including both long-term capital as well as short-term
working capital. The external ﬁnance eﬀect also is connected to investment. The balance-sheet con-
straint of ﬁrms says that the uses of funds must equal to the sources of funds, meaning that high in-
vestment ﬁrms must go to external capital markets more often than low investment ﬁrms. Lyandres,
Sun, and Zhang (2008) show that ﬁrms conducting initial public oﬀerings, seasoned equity oﬀerings,
and convertible bond oﬀerings invest much more than otherwise similar ﬁrms, and that adding an in-
vestment factor into standard factor models substantially reduces the magnitude of their long-term
underperformance measured as the intercepts from time series regressions. Interpreting accruals as
working capital investment, we also view the accrual anomaly as reﬂecting the general investment
eﬀect. Stickney, Brown, and Wahlen (2003) argue that accruals represent a direct form of invest-
ment and are an integral part of business growth of ﬁrms. Zhang (2007) documents that accruals
covary positively with employee growth, external ﬁnancing, and other aspects of corporate growth.
9In summary, we motivate from the model’s theoretical prediction the following testable
hypothesis, which we in turn try to refute in the subsequent empirical analysis:
Hypothesis 1. The magnitudes of the asset growth, external ﬁnance, and accrual
eﬀects should be higher in more constrained ﬁrms than in less constrained ﬁrms.
We also try to distinguish this ﬁnancial constraints hypothesis from alternative hypotheses. It
is well-known that ﬁnancial constraints and ﬁnancial distress are distinct, but related, concepts.
Financial constraints are frictions that prevent ﬁrms from ﬁnancing all of their desired investments.
This fundinginability can be due to credit constraints, inability to issue equity, excessive dependence
on bank loans, or illiquidity of assets. In contrast, Wruck (1990) deﬁnes ﬁnancial distress as situa-
tions when cash ﬂow is insuﬃcient to cover current obligations. These obligations can include unpaid
debt to suppliers and employees as well as missed principal or interest payments to bond holders.
Although conceptually diﬀerent, disentangling ﬁnancial constraints from ﬁnancial distress em-
pirically is much more diﬃcult. Because measures of ﬁnancial constraints and distress are correlated,
it is conceivable that the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints is simply driven by ﬁnancial distress. And
ﬁnancial distress is beyond the scope of our simple theoretical model. As such, we try to distinguish
the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints from that of ﬁnancial distress, using Ohlson’s (1980) O-score and
Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi’s (2008) failure probability as measures of ﬁnancial distress.
Hypothesis 2. The eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints on the magnitudes of the asset growth,
external ﬁnance, and accrual anomalies is distinct from the eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress.
Many studies interpret the asset growth, external ﬁnance, and accrual anomalies as due to
systematic mispricing (e.g., Ritter (1991), Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), Loughran
and Ritter (1995), Sloan (1996), Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2005), and Cooper, Gulen,
and Schill (2008)). If anomalies are driven by mispricing, why do professional arbitrageurs not ex-
ploit the trading opportunities and quickly eliminate the mispricing? Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
10argue that, because of a variety of trading frictions, arbitrage is costly and thereby limited. When
the costs of arbitrage outweigh the beneﬁts of arbitrage, the systematic mispricing would not be
quickly and entirely traded away. This hypothesis stresses the role of trading frictions from the
investor side, while our ﬁnancial constraints hypothesis stresses the role of investment frictions
from the ﬁrm side. Because they ride on diﬀerent frictions that probably coexist in the data, the
two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. It is still interesting, however, to study whether the
ﬁnancial constraints eﬀect subsists after controlling for standard limits to arbitrage proxies.
Hypothesis 3. The eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints on the magnitudes of the asset growth,
external ﬁnance, and accrual anomalies is distinct from the eﬀect of limits to arbitrage.
Following Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003), we use two measures of limits to arbitrage:
dollar trading volume and idiosyncratic stock volatility. The idea behind dollar trading volume
is transaction costs. When stocks are mispriced, transaction costs limit the extent to which
arbitrageurs can exploit the trading opportunities to eliminate the mispricing. Dollar trading
volume is an important indicator of transaction costs in the form of adverse price eﬀects of a trade
and the delay in processing the trade. If stocks are heavily traded, trades are more likely to be
completed quickly and are less likely to have adverse price impact. If stocks are thinly traded, trades
are less likely to be completed quickly and are more likely to have adverse price impact. The idea
behind idiosyncratic volatility is that, almost by deﬁnition, arbitrage strategies are not diversiﬁed.
The under-diversiﬁcation means that arbitrageurs must take idiosyncratic volatility without being
compensated with higher expected returns. As such, high idiosyncratic volatility means arbitrage is
more costly and limited, and low idiosyncratic volatility means arbitrage is less costly and limited.
3 Data
We obtain ﬁnancial statement data, such as capital expenditure, cash ﬂow, and debt from Compu-
stat and stock returns data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). All domestic
11common shares trading on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ with accounting and returns data avail-
able are included except for ﬁnancial ﬁrms (ﬁrms with four-digit SIC codes between 6000 and 6999).
Following Fama and French (1993), we also exclude closed-end funds, trusts, ADRs, REITS, and
units of beneﬁcial interest. To mitigate backﬁlling biases, we require ﬁrms to be listed on Compus-
tat for two years before using them. We use the U.S. one-month Treasury bill rates as the risk-free
rate in computing excess returns. To be included in the sample, a ﬁrm must have all the variables
required to compute the relevant variables. The sample period is from July 1963 to December 2006.
3.1 Measures of Financial Constraints
We use three measures of ﬁnancial constraints in our asset pricing tests.
• Payout ratio. The payout ratio is deﬁned as the ratio of total distributions including dividends
for preferred stocks (Compustat annual item 19), dividends for common stocks (item 21), and
share repurchases (item 115) divided by operating income before depreciation (item 13). At
the end of June of each year t, we rank ﬁrms based on their payout ratios measured at the
end of ﬁscal year t−1. We assign those ﬁrms in the bottom tercile of the annual payout ratio
distribution to the more ﬁnancially constrained subsample and those ﬁrms in the top tercile
to the less ﬁnancially constrained subsample. The payout ratio is a traditional measure of
ﬁnancial constraints (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson (1988), Almeida, Campello, and
Weisbach (2004), and Almeida and Campello (2007)).
• Bond rating. Following Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) and Almeida and Campello
(2007), we retrieve data on ﬁrms’ bond ratings assigned by Standard & Poor’s and categorize
those ﬁrms that never had their public debt rated during our sample period as ﬁnancially
constrained. Observations from those ﬁrms are only assigned to the constrained subsample in
years when the ﬁrms report positive debt. The ﬁnancially unconstrained subsample contains
those ﬁrms whose bonds have been rated during the sample period. This approach has been
used extensively in the corporate ﬁnance literature (e.g., Whited (1992), Kashyap, Lamont,
12and Stein (1994), and Cummins, Hasset, and Oliner (1999)).
• The WW index. Following Whited and Wu (2006), we compute the WW index using Com-
pustat quarterly data as follows:
WW = −0.091CF −0.062DIV POS +0.021TLTD−0.044LNTA+0.102ISG−0.035SG (4)
in which CF is the ratio of cash ﬂow to total assets, DIV POS is an indicator that takes the
value of one if the ﬁrm pays cash dividends, TLTD is the ratio of the long-term debt to total
assets, LNTA is the natural log of total assets, ISG is the ﬁrm’s three-digit industry sales
growth, and SG is ﬁrm sales growth. All variables are deﬂated by the replacement cost of
total assets as the sum of the replacement value of the capital stock plus the rest of the total
assets. We follow Whited (1992) in computing the replacement value of the capital stock.
Because of data limitations of the quarterly long-term debt (Compustat quarterly item 51),
the sample period for the WW-related tests is from July 1976 to December 2006.
The measures of ﬁnancial constraints are correlated. At the end of each year in the sample, we
calculate all the pairwise cross-sectional Spearman’s correlations and report the time series aver-
ages. The correlations are −0.21 between payout ratio and bond rating, −0.52 between the WW
index and payout ratio, and 0.39 between the WW index and bond rating. All the correlations are
signiﬁcant at the 1% level (evaluated with time series standard errors).
We also have experimented with the Kaplan and Zingales (1997, KZ) index. We ﬁnd that the
KZ index is only weakly correlated with the other measures, consistent with recent studies that cast
doubt on the KZ index as a valid measure of ﬁnancial constraints (e.g., Almeida, Campello, and
Weisbach (2004), Whited and Wu (2006), Hennessy and Whited (2007), and Hadlock and Pierce
(2008)). Hadlock and Pierce reestimate Kaplan and Zingales’s (1997) ordered logit model on a
larger, most recent sample, and ﬁnd that only two out of ﬁve components in the KZ index have signs
consistent with the index. As such, we do not use the KZ index to measure ﬁnancial constraints.
13The corporate ﬁnance literature has traditionally used asset size (book value of total assets) to
measure ﬁnancial constraints (e.g., Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Erickson and Whited (2000),
and Almeida and Campello (2007)). The cross-sectional Spearman’s correlation between asset size
and the WW index is −0.94 in our sample. The test results with asset size as a measure of ﬁnancial
constraints are largely similar to those with the WW index (not reported).
3.2 Portfolios Formed on Anomaly Variables
We ﬁrst report the descriptive statistics of one-way sorted portfolios formed on anomaly variables.
Following Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008), we measure asset growth, denoted AG, as the change in
total assets divided by lagged total assets (Compustat annual item 6). We measure net stock issues,
denoted NS, as the natural log of the ratio of the split-adjusted shares outstanding at the ﬁscal
yearend in t−1 divided by the split-adjusted shares outstanding at the ﬁscal yearend in t−2 (e.g.,
Fama and French (2008)). We calculate the split-adjusted shares outstanding as Compustat shares
outstanding (item 25) times Compustat adjustment factor (item 27). Following Sloan (1996), we
measure accruals, denoted AC, as changes in non-cash working capital minus depreciation expense
(scaled by average total assets in the recent two years): (△CA − △CASH) − (△CL − △STD −
△TP) − DEP, in which △CA is the change in current assets (item 4), △CASH is the change in
cash or cash equivalents (item 1), △CL is the change in current liabilities (item 5), △STD is the
change in debt included in current liabilities (item 34), △TP is the change in income taxes payable
(item 71), and DEP is depreciation and amortization expense (item 14).
At the end of June of each year t, we sort stocks into ﬁve equal-numbered quintiles on AG, NS,
and AC. Portfolio returns are calculated from July of year t to June of year t+1, and the portfolios
are rebalanced in each June. Table 1 reports average returns in excess of the one-month Treasury
bill rates, the CAPM alphas, and the alphas from the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model for
all the portfolios. Both equal-weighted and value-weighted results are reported.
Firms with high asset growth earn lower average returns than ﬁrms with low asset growth,
14consistent with Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008). The high-minus-low AG portfolio earns an
equal-weighted average return of −1.12% per month (t = −8.60) and a CAPM alpha of −1.20%
(t = −9.70). The value-weighted average return and CAPM alpha are −0.36% (t = −2.43) and
−0.48% per month (t = −3.35), respectively. The Fama-French model reduces the value-weighted
alpha to −0.07% per month, but leaves a signiﬁcant equal-weighted alpha of −1.01% (t = −8.16)
unexplained. High NS stocks earn lower average returns than low NS stocks. The high-minus-low
quintile earns an equal-weighted average return of −0.70% per month (t=−4.99) and a CAPM al-
pha of −0.86% (t=−6.86). The value-weighted average returns and alphas for the high-minus-low
NS portfolio are largely similar in magnitude to their equal-weighted counterparts. The Fama-
French model cannot explain the net issues puzzle: The equal-weighted alpha is −0.62% per month
(t=−5.78) and the value-weighted alpha is −0.44% (t=−4.13). Firms with high accruals earn lower
average returns than ﬁrms with low accruals, consistent with Sloan (1996). The high-minus-low
AC quintile has an average equal-weighted return of −0.57% per month (t = −6.95) and an average
value-weighted return of −0.25% (t = −1.85). The Fama-French model produces an equal-weighted
alpha of −0.56% per month (t = −6.88) and a value-weighted alpha of −0.28% (t = −2.10).
4 Main Empirical Results
We organize this section around the three testable hypotheses developed in Section 2. Section 4.1
documents the impact of ﬁnancial constraints on the anomalies in question. Section 4.2 distinguishes
the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints from that of ﬁnancial distress. And Section 4.3 disentangles the
eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints from that of limits of arbitrage.
4.1 Do Financial Constraints Aﬀect Capital Markets Anomalies?
We ask how the magnitudes of the asset growth, net stock issues, and accrual anomalies vary with
the degree of ﬁnancial constraints. Our test design is simple. At the end of June of year t, we split
the sample into subsamples based on a given measure of ﬁnancial constraints at the end of ﬁscal year
15t−1. Within each subsample, we sort stocks into ﬁve portfolios based on a given anomaly variable.
We then compare the magnitude of the average returns and alphas of the high-minus-low portfolios
across extreme subsamples. This sample-splitting method based on a priori measures of ﬁnancial
constraints has been used extensively in the corporate ﬁnance literature to study the impact of these
constraints on ﬁrm value and capital investment (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson (1988)).
The Asset Growth Portfolios
Table 2 reports the variation of the asset growth eﬀect across subsamples split by ﬁnancial con-
straints measures. From Panel A, the equal-weighted average return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-
French alpha of the high-minus-low AG portfolio are −1.60%,−1.68%, and −1.40% per month in
the low payout ratio (most constrained) tercile, respectively, and are all more than 7.5 standard
errors from zero. In contrast, their counterparts in the high payout ratio (least constrained) tercile
are −0.51%,−0.55%, and −0.38% per month, which are less than one-third of their respective mag-
nitudes. Similarly, the value-weighted average return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha of the
high-minus-low AG portfolio are higher in magnitude in the low payout ratio subsample than in the
high payout ratio subsample: −0.81% vs. −0.23%, −0.86% vs. −0.31%, and −0.40% vs. 0.07% per
month, respectively. We also report the t-statistics that test the diﬀerence in the average return,
the CAPM alpha, or the Fama-French alpha of the high-minus-low AG portfolio across the extreme
payout ratio subsamples equals zero. The equal-weighted diﬀerences are all more than 5.5 standard
errors from zero. However, the value-weighted diﬀerences are insigniﬁcant.
The asset growth eﬀect is stronger in the constrained ﬁrms than in the unconstrained ﬁrms, as
deﬁned by bond ratings. Panel B shows that, in the unconstrained subsample, the equal-weighted
average return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha of the high-minus-low AG portfolio are
−0.71%,−0.82%, and −0.57% per month, which are lower in magnitude than their counterparts in
the constrained subsample, −1.50%,−1.56%, and −1.43% per month, respectively. And the diﬀer-
ences are all more than 6.9 standard errors from zero. The value-weighted results are similar. The
16value-weighted average return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha in the unconstrained sample
are −0.32%,−0.45%, and −0.03% per month, which are smaller in magnitude than their counter-
parts in the constrained sample, −0.72%,−0.79%, and −0.47%, respectively. And the diﬀerences
across the two subsamples are all more than 2.4 standard errors from zero.
The asset growth anomaly is stronger in ﬁrms with high WW index values. But this re-
sult is only reliable in equal-weighted returns. From Panel C, the equal-weighted average return,
CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha of the high-minus-low AG portfolio are −0.49%,−0.63%,
and −0.31% per month, respectively, in the low WW tercile. These estimates are much lower in
magnitude than those in the high WW tercile, −1.66%,−1.66%, and −1.58% per month. And the
diﬀerences are more than 3.9 standard errors from zero. However, the diﬀerences in value-weighted
estimates, ranging from −0.06 to −0.42, are insigniﬁcant.
We also have measured investment as the annual change in property, plant, and equipment plus
the annual change in inventories divided by lagged total assets, as in Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang
(2008). This variable is arguably a more direct measure of investment. The results are largely
similar with the asset growth results in Table 2 (see Appendix A.1 and Table A1 for details).
The Net Stock Issues Portfolios
Table 3 shows the net stock issues anomaly varies across subsamples split by ﬁnancial constraints.
From Panel A, the equal-weighted average return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha of the high-
minus-low NS portfolio are larger in magnitude in the low payout tercile than in the high payout ter-
cile: −1.08% vs. −0.63%, −1.24% vs. −0.64%, and −0.96% vs. −0.52% per month, respectively. The
diﬀerences are all signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The value-weighted average return of the high-minus-
low NS portfolio is −0.75% per month in the low payout subsample, which is higher in magnitude
than that in the high payout subsample, −0.51%. But the diﬀerence of −0.24% is only marginally
signiﬁcant (t=−1.78). The CAPM alpha also is higher in the more constrained subsample than
that in the less constrained subsample: −0.90% vs. −0.50% per month, and the diﬀerence is 2.6
17standard errors from zero. But the Fama-French alphas are similar across the extreme subsamples.
Panel B shows that, in the unconstrained subsample with bond ratings, the equal-weighted
average return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha of the high-minus-low NS portfolio are
−0.49%,−0.62%, and −0.41% per month, which are lower in magnitude than their counterparts in
the constrained subsample without bond ratings, −0.83%,−1.01%, and −0.77%, respectively. The
diﬀerences across the two subsamples are more than 2.7 standard errors from zero. The diﬀerences
in the value-weighted average return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha are −0.60%,−0.75%,
and −0.50% per month, which are all more than 3.6 standard errors from zero.
Using the WW index, Panel C shows that the NS eﬀect is stronger in more ﬁnancially con-
strained ﬁrms. The equal-weighted average return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha of the
high-minus-low NS portfolio are −0.45%,−0.62%, and −0.45% per month in the low WW tercile,
which are more than halved in magnitude from their counterparts, −1.09%,−1.34%, and −1.13%,
respectively, in the high WW tercile. And the diﬀerences across the two subsamples are all more
than 2.5 standard errors from zero. The value-weighted results are similar: The diﬀerences in av-
erage return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha are −0.86%,−0.97%, and −0.85% per month,
which are all more than 3.6 standard errors from zero.
The Accrual Portfolios
Table 4 shows that the accrual anomaly also is stronger in more constrained ﬁrms, although the
eﬀect exists mostly in equal-weighted returns. From Panel A, the equal-weighted average return,
CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha of the high-minus-low AC portfolio are −0.79%,−0.82%, and
−0.75% per month in the low payout subsample, respectively. In contrast, their magnitudes are
more than halved in the high payout subsample: −0.34%,−0.37%, and −0.35% per month, respec-
tively. And the diﬀerences are more than 2.9 standard errors from zero. The value-weighted average
return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha of the high-minus-low AC portfolio also are higher
in magnitude in the more constrained subsample: −0.47% vs. −0.15%, −0.49% vs. −0.19%, and
18−0.46% vs. −0.23% per month, respectively. However, the diﬀerences are all within 1.4 standard
errors of zero. From Panel B, splitting the sample by bond rating yields largely similar results.
From Panel C, splitting the sample by the WW index also yields signiﬁcant results in equal-
weighted returns, but not in value-weighted returns. In the low WW subsample, the equa-weighted
average return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha are −0.26%, −0.27%, and −0.25% per month,
which are more than halved in magnitude from their counterparts in the the high WW subsample,
−0.77%,−0.75%, and −0.67% per month, respectively. The diﬀerences across the two subsam-
ples are all more than 2.5 standard errors from zero. However, the value-weighted average return,
CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha in the low WW tercile are actually higher in magnitude
than their counterparts in the high WW tercile, but the diﬀerences are close to zero.
We also have used net operating assets from Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004) as an
alternative measure of accruals. Following Hirshleifer et al., we measure net operating assets as
operating assets minus operating liabilities scaled by lagged total assets. This variable is closely
related to the comprehensive measure of accruals advocated by Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and
Tuna (2005). The impact of ﬁnancial constraints on the net operating assets eﬀect is largely similar
to the impact on the asset growth eﬀect (see Appendix A.1 and Table A2 for details).
4.2 Disentangling Financial Constraints from Financial Distress
This subsection tests Hypothesis 2 that the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints is distinct from that of
distress on the anomalies. We measure ﬁnancial distress with Ohlson’s (1980) O-score, deﬁned as:


























+0.285(1 if a net loss for the last two years, 0 otherwise) − 0.521
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Net incomet − Net incomet−1
|Net incomet| + |Net incomet−1|
￿
19in which total assets are measured as Compustat annual item 6, total liabilities as item 181, working
capital as current assets (item 4) minus current liabilities (item 5), net income as item 172, and
funds from operations as item 13. The correlations of O-score with measures of ﬁnancial constraints
are −0.37 with payout ratio, 0.21 with bond ratings, and 0.38 with the WW index. As such, it is
necessary to disentangle the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints from the eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress.
Table 5 shows how the asset growth, net stock issues, and accrual anomalies vary across subsam-
ples split by O-score. The test design is the same as in Table 2. At the end of June of year t, we split
the sample into three equal-numbered subsamples by O-score in ﬁscal year ending in calendar year
t−1. Within each subsample, we sort stocks into ﬁve quintile portfolios based on a given anomaly
variable, and compare the magnitudes of the average returns and alphas of the high-minus-low port-
folios across diﬀerent O-score subsamples. The table shows that the equal-weighted asset growth
and net stock issues eﬀects are stronger in more distressed ﬁrms than in less distressed ﬁrms. The
value-weighted results go in the same direction, but are insigniﬁcant. And for the most part, the
magnitude of the accrual eﬀect does not vary signiﬁcantly across the extreme O-score subsamples.
The Horse Race: Financial Constraints versus Financial Distress
To distinguish the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints from the eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress, we study the
variation in the magnitude of the anomalies across subsamples split jointly by a given measure of
ﬁnancial constraints and a given measure of ﬁnancial distress. The test design is a natural extension
of that in Tables 2 to 5. At the end of June of year t, we ﬁrst split the sample into six subsamples
by an independent three-by-two sort on payout ratio (or the WW index) and O-score. We also split
the sample into four subsamples by an independent two-by-two sort on bond ratings and O-score.
The sort on bond ratings categorizes ﬁrms into those with debt outstanding but without a bond
rating and those with bond ratings. All the sorting variables are measured in ﬁscal year ending in
calendar year t−1. Within each subsample, ﬁrms are sorted into ﬁve equal-numbered portfolios on
a given anomaly variable. Portfolio returns are computed from July of year t to June of year t+1,
20and the portfolios are rebalanced at the end of each June.
Table 6 reports the results. We only report the results for the high-minus-low portfolios to save
space. Panel A shows the horse race between payout ratio and O-score. Payout ratio dominates
the O-score in driving the magnitude of the anomalies. The diﬀerences in the equal-weighted av-
erage return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha of the high-minus-low AG portfolio across the
high and low payout ratio subsamples are −0.69%,−0.85%, and −0.64% per month, which are all
signiﬁcant at the 5% level, in the low O-score universe. The corresponding diﬀerences in the high
O-score universe are largely similar: −0.87%,−0.88%, and −0.80%, respectively. For comparison,
the diﬀerences in the equal-weighted average return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha of the
high-minus-low AG portfolio across the high and low O-score subsamples are −0.50%,−0.29%,
and −0.52% per month in the low payout ratio subsample, and are −0.32%,−0.26%, and −0.36%,
respectively, in the high payout ratio subsample. Although mostly signiﬁcant at the 5% level, the
diﬀerences generated from splitting the sample on O-scores are often much lower in magnitude than
the diﬀerences from splitting on the payout ratio.
From Panel A, payout ratio also dominates O-score in driving the net stock issues and accrual
anomalies. The diﬀerences in the equal-weighted average return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French
alpha of the high-minus-low NS portfolio across the high and low payout ratio subsamples in the
high O-score universe are −0.46%, −0.65%, and −0.53% per monthly, which are all signiﬁcant at
the 5% level. In contrast, the corresponding diﬀerences across the high and low O-score subsamples
in the low payout ratio universe are −0.25%,−0.22%, and −0.27%, respectively, none of which are
signiﬁcant. The diﬀerences in the equal-weighted average return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French
alpha of the high-minus-low accrual portfolio across the high and low payout ratio subsamples in
the low O-score universe are −0.39%,−0.43%, and −0.40% per month, which are all signiﬁcant at
the 5% level. In contrast, the corresponding diﬀerences across the high and low O-score subsamples
in the low payout ratio universe are −0.22%,−0.11%, and −0.17%, none of which are signiﬁcant.
21Panel B shows that bond rating also dominates O-score in driving the anomalies. The diﬀerences
in the value-weighted average return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha of the high-minus-low
AG portfolio across the constrained and unconstrained subsamples in the low O-score universe are
−0.37%,−0.39%, and −0.41%, respectively, all of which are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. In contrast,
the corresponding diﬀerences across the high and low O-score subsamples in the unconstrained
universe are −0.05%,0.09%, and −0.29%, none of which are signiﬁcant. However, the eﬀects of
constraints and distress on equal-weighted returns are more comparable in magnitude.
Panel B also demonstrates the complete dominance of bond rating over O-score in driving the
net stock issues eﬀect. The impact of bond rating on the anomaly’s magnitude is economically
large and statistically signiﬁcant even after we control for O-score, but controlling for bond rating
eliminates the impact of O-score. In particular, the diﬀerences in the value-weighted average return,
CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha of the high-minus-low NS portfolio across the constrained
and unconstrained subsamples in the low O-score universe are −0.63%,−0.79%, and −0.63%, re-
spectively, all of which are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. In contrast, the corresponding diﬀerences
across the high and low O-score subsamples in the unconstrained universe are −0.09%,−0.08%,
and −0.11%, none of which are signiﬁcant. Bonding rating also dominates O-score in driving the
accrual anomaly, but the results are less dramatic than those for the net stock issues anomaly.
Panel C shows that the WW index completely dominates O-score in driving the net stock
issues anomaly, and to a lesser extent, in driving the asset growth and accrual anomalies. The
diﬀerences in the equal-weighted average return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha of the
high-minus-low AG portfolio across the high and low WW subsamples in the low O-score universe
are −0.75%,−0.77%, and −1.05% per month, respectively. In contrast, the corresponding diﬀer-
ences across the high and low O-score subsamples in the low WW universe are −0.30%,−0.17%,
and −0.37%. The diﬀerences in the value-weighted average return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French
alpha of the high-minus-low NS portfolio across the extreme WW subsamples in the low O-score
universe are −0.77%,−0.90%, and −0.94%, respectively, all of which are signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
22In contrast, the corresponding diﬀerences across the extreme distress subsamples in the low WW
universe are −0.23%,−0.23%, and −0.17%, none of which are signiﬁcant. The diﬀerences in the
equal-weighted average return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha of the high-minus-low accrual
portfolio across the extreme WW subsamples in the high O-score universe are −0.52%,−0.55%,
and −0.44%. In contrast, the corresponding diﬀerences across the extreme O-score subsamples in
the high WW universe are only −0.24%,−0.07%, and −0.07%, respectively.
Robustness
We evaluate the robustness of the results using an alternative measure of ﬁnancial distress, which
is the failure probability provided by Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). Although speciﬁc
details vary, we continue to observe that the eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress does not subsume, and is often
subsumed by, the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints (see Appendix A.2 and Tables A3 and A4 for details).
4.3 Disentangling Financial Constraints from Limits to Arbitrage
Although variables that are proxies for limits to arbitrage aﬀect capital markets anomalies, their
eﬀect does not subsume, and is often subsumed by, the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints.
The Impact of Limits to Arbitrage
Following Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003), we use two measures of limits to arbitrage: dollar
trading volume and idiosyncratic volatility. Dollar trading volume is the annual volume of trade in
a ﬁrm’s shares from July 1 of year t−1 to June 30 of year t, in millions of dollars. At the end of each
June, we compute dollar volume for each ﬁrm as the sum of last twelve months’ daily dollar vol-
ume, which is the product of share volume and daily closing price from CRSP. Arbitrages are more
limited for stocks with low trading volume (indicating low liquidity and high transaction costs)
than for stocks with high trading volume (indicating high liquidity and low transaction costs). We
obtain idiosyncratic volatility by regressing daily stock returns on a value-weighted market portfolio
over a maximum of 250 days ending on June 30 of year t and then calculating the volatility of the
23residuals. Arbitrages are more limited for stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility.
The limits to arbitrage proxies are correlated with ﬁnancial constraints measures. At the end
of each year we calculate the pairwise cross-sectional Spearman’s correlations and report the time
series averages. The correlations of trading volume with constraints measures are 0.28 with payout
ratio, −0.38 with bond rating, and −0.75 with the WW index, and the correlations of idiosyncratic
volatility are −0.54 with payout ratio, 0.27 with bond rating, and 0.65 with the WW index. All
the correlations are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. As such, it is necessary to disentangle the eﬀect of
ﬁnancial constraints from that of limits to arbitrage.
Table 7 shows how the anomalies vary across subsamples split by trading volume. The test
design is the same as in Table 2. At the end of each June of year t, we split the sample into
three equal-numbered subsamples by trading volume in June of year t. Within each subsample, we
sort stocks into ﬁve portfolios based on a given anomaly variable, and compare the magnitude of
the anomaly across diﬀerent subsamples. The table shows some evidence that the equal-weighted
asset growth eﬀect is stronger in the low volume tercile than in the high volume tercile, but the
eﬀect is nonexistent in value-weighted returns. The equal-weighted net stock issues eﬀect is actu-
ally stronger in the high volume stocks than in the low volume stocks. And the diﬀerences in the
magnitude of the accrual eﬀect across the extreme trading volume subsamples are all within 1.8
standard errors from zero. In all, the evidence on the limits to arbitrage hypothesis is mixed when
we use dollar volume as a proxy for the arbitrage limits.
Table 8 shows how the anomalies vary across subsamples split by idiosyncratic volatility. At the
end of each June of year t, we split the sample into three equal-numbered subsamples by idiosyn-
cratic volatility measured with daily returns ending on June 30 of year t. Within each subsample,
we sort stocks into ﬁve portfolios based on a given anomaly variable, and compare the magnitude of
the anomaly across diﬀerent subsamples. The table shows strong impact of idiosyncratic volatility.
The diﬀerences in equal-weighted average return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha of the
24high-minus-low AG portfolio across the high and low idiosyncratic volatility subsamples are around
−1.50% per month, and are all more than eight standard errors from zero. The value-weighted
diﬀerences range from −0.89% to −1.08% per month, and are more than 3.5 standard errors from
zero. The equal-weighted diﬀerences of the high-minus-low NS portfolio are around −0.50% per
month, and are more than three standard errors from zero. The value-weighted diﬀerences are
largely similar. Finally, the equal-weighted diﬀerences of the high-minus-low accrual portfolio are
economically large and statistically signiﬁcant, but the value-weighted diﬀerences are not.
The Horse Race: Financial Constraints versus Limits to Arbitrage
To disentangle the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints from the eﬀect of limits to arbitrage, we examine
how anomalies vary in the magnitude across subsamples split jointly by a constraints measure and
by a proxy for limits to arbitrage. The test design is the similar to Table 6. At the end of June
of year t, we split the sample with an independent three-by-two sort on payout ratio (or the WW
index) and trading volume (or idiosyncratic volatility). We also split the sample into four samples
by an independent two-by-two sort on bond rating and trading volume (or idiosyncratic volatility).
The constraints proxies are measured in the ﬁscal yearend of t−1, but the limits to arbitrage proxies
are measured in June of year t. Within each subsample, we sort stocks into ﬁve equal-numbered
portfolios on a given anomaly variable, and calculate returns from July of year t to June of year
t+1. Only the results for the high-minus-low portfolios are reported to save space.
Table 9 reports the horse race between ﬁnancial constraints and trading volume. In general,
ﬁnancial constraints dominate trading volume in driving the anomalies. Without discussing the
details, we note that bond rating completely dominates trading volume in driving the AG eﬀect.
Payout ratio and bond rating retain some explanatory power for the equal-weighted accrual anomaly
after we control for trading volume, but trading volume shows no explanatory power after we control
for payout ratio or bond rating. The WW index also shows stronger explanatory power than trad-
ing volume in driving the asset growth eﬀect. In particular, Panel C shows that after we control for
25the WW index, the average return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha of zero-cost AG, NS, and
AC portfolios in the low volume subsample are mostly lower in magnitude than their counterparts
in the high volume subsample. This evidence casts doubt on the limits to arbitrage hypothesis.
Table 10 reports the horse race between ﬁnancial constraints and idiosyncratic volatility. We
note that idiosyncratic volatility dominates the constraints measures in driving the asset growth
and net stock issues eﬀects, but the constraints retain some explanatory power even after we con-
trol for idiosyncratic volatility. In particular, the equal-weighted diﬀerences in the average return,
CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha across the extreme idiosyncratic volatility subsamples are
−1.13%,−1.05%, and −1.12% per month, respectively, in the low payout ratio subsample. These
estimates are higher in magnitude than the corresponding equal-weighted diﬀerences between the
low and high payout ratio subsamples in the high idiosyncratic volatility universe: −0.44%,−0.44%,
and −0.37%, respectively. The impact of constraints is more comparable with the impact of idiosyn-
cratic volatility on the accrual anomaly. In particular, the equal-weighted diﬀerences in the average
return, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French alpha across the extreme payout ratio subsamples in the low
idiosyncratic volatility subsample are −0.53%,−0.56%, and −0.48% per month, which are higher
in magnitude than the corresponding equal-weighted diﬀerences between the extreme idiosyncratic
volatility subsamples in the high payout ratio universe: −0.41%,−0.42%, and −0.40%, respectively.
It is worthwhile to note that limits to arbitrage are unlikely to be the only source that drives
the strong relation between idiosyncratic volatility and the magnitude of anomalies. Idiosyncratic
return volatility is highly correlated with total return volatility in the cross-section (e.g., Ang,
Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006)). And mechanically, a sample of ﬁrms with more volatile stock
returns is likely to contain more cross-sectional dispersion in expected returns at any point of time
than a sample of ﬁrms with less volatile stock returns. Sagi and Seasholes (2007) use this mech-
anism to interpret their evidence that momentum proﬁts are stronger in ﬁrms with high revenue
volatility. In particular, their real options model does not admit any limits of arbitrage.
265 Conclusion
Our central insight is that the magnitude of the asset growth, net stock issues, and accrual anomalies
tends to be higher in ﬁnancially more constrained ﬁrms than in ﬁnancially less constrained ﬁrms.
In a frictionless world, investment is perfectly elastic to changes in the discount rate. With ﬁnancial
frictions, investment is less elastic, meaning that a given magnitude of change in investment is asso-
ciated with a higher magnitude of change in the discount rate. Equivalently, investment is a more
powerful predictor of future stock returns when ﬁnancial frictions are more severe. Our empirical
tests support this theoretical prediction. Further tests show that this eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints
is distinct from the eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress and the eﬀect of limits of arbitrage on the anomalies.
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30Table 1 : Descriptive Statistics of One-Way Quintile Portfolios Sorted on Asset Growth, Net Stock Issues, and Accruals in the
Full Sample (July 1963–December 2006, 534 Months)
Asset growth (AG) is the change in total assets (Compustat annual item 6) divided by lagged total assets. The net stock issues (NS) are the natural log of the
ratio of the split-adjusted shares outstanding at the ﬁscal year-end in t−1 divided by the split-adjusted shares outstanding at the ﬁscal year-end in t−2. The
split-adjusted shares outstanding is Compustat shares outstanding (item 25) times the Compustat adjustment factor (item 27). Accruals (AC) are changes in
non-cash working capital minus depreciation expense (scaled by average total assets in the recent two years): (△CA−△CASH)−(△CL−△STD−△TP)−DEP,
in which △CA is the change in current assets (item 4), △CASH is the change in cash or cash equivalents (item 1), △CL is the change in current liabilities
(item 5), △STD is the change in debt included in current liabilities (item 34), △TP is the change in income taxes payable (item 71), and DEP is depreciation
and amortization expense (item 14). At the end of each June of year t, ﬁrms are categorized into ﬁve equal-numbered portfolios based on a given sorting
variable. Portfolio returns are computed from July of year t to June of year t+1, and the portfolios are rebalanced in each June. Excess return (r) is the
diﬀerence between portfolio returns and one-month Treasury bill rate. The CAPM alphas (α) and Fama-French alphas (αFF) are the intercepts from regressing
portfolio excess returns on the market factor and the Fama-French three factors, respectively. The superscript ew denotes equal-weighted returns and vw
denotes value-weighted returns. The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations.


























Low 1.49 0.92 0.56 0.65 0.15 −0.01 1.16 0.68 0.30 0.68 0.24 0.12 1.21 0.62 0.33 0.52 −0.02 0.10
2 1.03 0.55 0.22 0.56 0.14 0.01 1.06 0.58 0.19 0.49 0.09 0.01 1.07 0.54 0.25 0.49 0.03 0.04
3 0.85 0.37 0.10 0.47 0.05 −0.01 0.94 0.40 0.14 0.55 0.07 0.12 0.93 0.40 0.11 0.59 0.11 0.12
4 0.77 0.23 0.00 0.52 0.02 0.16 0.86 0.26 0.09 0.45 −0.10 0.05 0.85 0.29 0.03 0.37 −0.13 −0.04
High 0.37 −0.29 −0.45 0.29 −0.33 −0.09 0.46 −0.17 −0.31 0.14 −0.40 −0.32 0.63 0.01 −0.24 0.27 −0.35 −0.18
H−L −1.12 −1.20 −1.01 −0.36 −0.48 −0.07 −0.70 −0.86 −0.62 −0.55 −0.64 −0.44 −0.57 −0.61 −0.56 −0.25 −0.33 −0.28
tH−L −8.60 −9.70 −8.16 −2.43 −3.35 −0.59 −4.99 −6.86 −5.78 −4.40 −5.36 −4.13 −6.95 −7.76 −6.88 −1.85 −2.54 −2.10
3
1Table 2 : The Asset Growth Eﬀect Across Subsamples Split by Payout Ratio, Bond Rating, and the Whited-Wu (WW) Index
In June of each year t, we split the sample into three equal-numbered subsamples by payout ratio (Panel A), two subsamples by bond ratings (Panel B), and
three equal-numbered subsamples by the WW index (Panel C), all measured at the end of ﬁscal year t−1. In Panels A and B, the sample is from July 1963 to
December 2006 (534 months). In Panel C, the sample is from July 1976 to December 2006 (378 months) because of the quarterly data limitation for long-term
debt in the construction of the WW index. Payout ratio is deﬁned as the sum of dividends and stock repurchase divided by operating income. In Panel B, the
constrained subsample contains all the ﬁrms with debt outstanding but without a bond rating, and the unconstrained subsample contains all the ﬁrms whose
bonds are rated. See Section 3 for details of constructing the WW index. Within each subsample, we sort ﬁrms into ﬁve equal-numbered portfolios based on
asset growth (AG) deﬁned as the change in total assets (item 6) divided by lagged total assets. The high-minus-low portfolio (H−L AG) is long in the high
AG portfolio and short in the low AG portfolio. Portfolio returns are computed from July of year t to June of year t+1. The portfolios are rebalanced at the
end of each June. Excess return (r) is the diﬀerence between portfolio returns and the one-month Treasury bill rate. The CAPM alphas (α) and Fama-French
alphas (αFF) are the intercepts from regressing portfolio excess returns on the market factor and the three Fama-French factors, respectively. The superscript
ew denotes equal-weighted returns and vw denotes value-weighted returns. The t-statistics, tH−L, are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations.
Panel A: Subsamples by payout ratio Panel B: Subsamples by bond rating Panel C: Subsamples by the WW index


























Low 1.81 1.15 0.75 0.97 0.23 0.11 1.32 0.77 0.45 0.63 0.16 0.00 0.89 0.28 −0.15 0.76 0.19 0.00
2 1.40 0.80 0.41 0.76 0.09 −0.02 0.92 0.46 0.19 0.51 0.12 0.02 0.83 0.30 −0.07 0.58 0.07 −0.02
3 1.12 0.51 0.19 0.77 0.10 0.15 0.83 0.36 0.13 0.44 0.01 −0.04 0.77 0.22 −0.07 0.65 0.11 0.06
4 0.80 0.15 −0.08 0.41 −0.29 −0.12 0.81 0.27 0.12 0.48 −0.01 0.14 0.75 0.13 −0.09 0.57 −0.06 0.09
High 0.21 −0.52 −0.65 0.15 −0.63 −0.29 0.62 −0.05 −0.12 0.31 −0.29 −0.03 0.41 −0.36 −0.45 0.39 −0.36 −0.05
H−L AG −1.60 −1.68 −1.40 −0.81 −0.86 −0.40 −0.71 −0.82 −0.57 −0.32 −0.45 −0.03 −0.49 −0.63 −0.31 −0.37 −0.55 −0.05
tH−L −8.48 −9.17 −7.94 −3.06 −3.30 −1.52 −4.92 −6.15 −4.39 −2.08 −3.09 −0.25 −3.53 −4.74 −2.72 −1.88 −2.89 −0.31


























Low 1.07 0.61 0.22 0.65 0.22 0.01 1.62 1.05 0.67 0.59 −0.02 −0.16 2.13 1.35 1.12 0.59 −0.31 −0.36
2 0.77 0.37 0.06 0.56 0.16 0.02 1.16 0.68 0.28 0.55 0.08 −0.12 1.93 1.30 1.02 0.99 0.20 0.15
3 0.74 0.34 0.06 0.40 0.03 −0.04 0.88 0.41 0.08 0.53 0.08 −0.03 1.49 0.88 0.62 0.94 0.15 0.12
4 0.67 0.25 0.02 0.50 0.08 0.08 0.73 0.20 −0.12 0.33 −0.22 −0.24 1.02 0.39 0.12 0.53 −0.28 −0.35
High 0.56 0.06 −0.16 0.42 −0.09 0.08 0.12 −0.51 −0.76 −0.14 −0.80 −0.63 0.47 −0.31 −0.47 −0.03 −0.92 −0.83
H−L AG −0.51 −0.55 −0.38 −0.23 −0.31 0.07 −1.50 −1.56 −1.43 −0.72 −0.79 −0.47 −1.66 −1.66 −1.58 −0.61 −0.61 −0.47
tH−L −6.84 −7.60 −5.98 −1.63 −2.21 0.60 −10.63 −11.44 −10.24 −4.11 −4.55 −2.90 −7.45 −7.76 −7.27 −2.58 −2.65 −1.99
Low-minus-high payout ratio Without-minus-with bond rating High-minus-low WW
H−L AG −1.09 −1.13 −1.02 −0.58 −0.55 −0.47 −0.79 −0.74 −0.86 −0.40 −0.34 −0.43 −1.17 −1.03 −1.27 −0.24 −0.06 −0.42
tH−L −5.64 −5.91 −5.59 −0.90 −0.84 −0.75 −7.23 −6.97 −8.03 −2.62 −2.44 −3.07 −4.26 −3.97 −4.45 −0.45 0.03 −0.71
3
2Table 3 : The Net Stock Issues Eﬀect Across Subsamples Split by Payout Ratio, Bond Rating, and Whited-Wu (WW) Index
At the end of June of year t, we ﬁrst split the sample into three equal-numbered subsamples by payout ratio (Panel A), two subsamples by bond ratings (Panel
B), and three equal-numbered subsamples by the WW index (Panel C) using accounting variables in ﬁscal year ending in calendar year t−1. In Panels A
and B, the sample is from July 1963 to December 2006 (534 months). In Panel C, the sample is from July 1976 to December 2006 (378 months) because of
the quarterly data limitation for long-term debt in the construction of the WW index. Payout ratio is the sum of dividends and stock repurchase divided
by operating income. In Panel B, the constrained subsample contains all the ﬁrms with debt outstanding but without a bond rating, and the unconstrained
subsample contains all the ﬁrms whose bonds are rated. See Section 3 for details of constructing the WW index. Within each subsample, ﬁrms are sorted into
ﬁve equal-numbered portfolios based on net stock issues (NS). NS is the change in the natural logarithms of the number of shares outstanding adjusted for
splits to capture the eﬀect of share repurchases and seasoned equity oﬀerings. The high-minus-low portfolio (H−L NS) is long in the high NS portfolio and
short in the low NS portfolio. Portfolio returns are computed over the period from July of year t to June of year t+1. The portfolios are rebalanced at the
end of each June. Excess return (r) is the diﬀerence between portfolio returns and the one-month Treasury bill rate. The CAPM alphas (α) and Fama-French
alphas (αFF) are the intercepts from regressing portfolio excess returns on the market factor and the three Fama-French factors, respectively. The superscript
ew denotes equal-weighted returns and vw denotes value-weighted returns. The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations.
Panel A: Subsamples by payout ratio Panel B: Subsamples by bond rating Panel C: Subsamples by the WW index


























Low 1.56 1.00 0.57 0.70 0.10 −0.17 1.08 0.60 0.28 0.63 0.20 0.11 0.89 0.34 −0.01 0.81 0.28 0.17
2 1.35 0.74 0.37 0.84 0.20 0.09 1.02 0.56 0.23 0.44 0.03 −0.03 0.74 0.19 −0.17 0.50 −0.04 −0.03
3 1.08 0.40 0.17 0.59 −0.12 −0.02 0.87 0.34 0.16 0.50 0.02 0.09 0.77 0.17 −0.13 0.56 −0.02 0.04
4 0.79 0.07 −0.13 0.52 −0.27 0.03 0.92 0.33 0.22 0.45 −0.07 0.09 0.79 0.13 −0.08 0.64 −0.04 0.08
High 0.49 −0.24 −0.38 −0.05 −0.81 −0.55 0.59 −0.02 −0.13 0.21 −0.31 −0.27 0.44 −0.28 −0.45 0.32 −0.34 −0.27
H−L NS −1.08 −1.24 −0.96 −0.75 −0.90 −0.38 −0.49 −0.62 −0.41 −0.42 −0.50 −0.37 −0.45 −0.62 −0.45 −0.48 −0.63 −0.44
tH−L −6.95 −9.00 −7.41 −3.37 −4.23 −1.96 −3.63 −4.97 −3.70 −3.38 −4.08 −3.30 −2.81 −4.06 −3.02 −2.98 −3.88 −2.93


























Low 1.10 0.65 0.30 0.74 0.31 0.11 1.21 0.75 0.31 0.69 0.25 0.02 1.88 1.33 1.02 1.19 0.53 0.35
2 0.81 0.40 0.09 0.59 0.17 0.10 1.10 0.63 0.19 0.35 −0.11 −0.35 1.63 1.04 0.70 0.77 0.06 −0.14
3 0.69 0.27 −0.02 0.41 0.02 −0.01 0.94 0.41 0.07 0.51 0.00 −0.03 1.46 0.77 0.53 0.78 −0.05 −0.07
4 0.73 0.29 0.06 0.53 0.08 0.13 0.81 0.23 −0.01 0.36 −0.25 −0.16 1.22 0.44 0.28 0.48 −0.45 −0.36
High 0.47 0.01 −0.22 0.23 −0.20 −0.24 0.38 −0.26 −0.46 −0.33 −1.00 −0.85 0.79 −0.02 −0.11 −0.15 −1.06 −0.94
H−L NS −0.63 −0.64 −0.52 −0.51 −0.50 −0.35 −0.83 −1.01 −0.77 −1.02 −1.25 −0.87 −1.09 −1.34 −1.13 −1.34 −1.60 −1.29
tH−L −6.96 −6.91 −5.49 −4.50 −4.36 −3.11 −4.99 −6.97 −6.12 −5.01 −6.85 −5.74 −5.47 −7.64 −6.93 −5.79 −7.54 −7.07
Low-minus-high payout ratio Without-minus-with bond rating High-minus-low WW
H−L NS −0.45 −0.60 −0.44 −0.24 −0.40 −0.03 −0.34 −0.39 −0.36 −0.60 −0.75 −0.50 −0.64 −0.72 −0.68 −0.86 −0.97 −0.85
tH−L −2.08 −3.58 −2.43 −1.78 −2.59 −1.21 −2.75 −3.52 −3.16 −3.97 −5.29 −3.61 −3.11 −3.49 −2.59 −3.83 −4.32 −3.69
3
3Table 4 : The Accrual Eﬀect Across Subsamples Split by Payout Ratio, Bond Rating, and Whited-Wu (WW) Index
At the end of June of year t, we ﬁrst split the sample into three equal-numbered subsamples by payout ratio (Panel A), two subsamples by bond ratings (Panel
B), and three equal-numbered subsamples by the WW index (Panel C) using accounting variables in ﬁscal year ending in calendar year t−1. In Panels A
and B, the sample is from July 1963 to December 2006 (534 months). In Panel C, the sample is from July 1976 to December 2006 (378 months) because of
the quarterly data limitation for long-term debt in the construction of the WW index. Payout ratio is the sum of dividends and stock repurchase divided
by operating income. In Panel B, the constrained subsample contains all the ﬁrms with debt outstanding but without a bond rating, and the unconstrained
subsample contains all the ﬁrms whose bonds are rated. See Section 3 for details of constructing the WW index. Within each subsample, ﬁrms are sorted
into ﬁve equal-numbered portfolios based on accruals (AC). AC is the changes in non-cash working capital minus depreciation expense scaled by average total
assets in the recent two years. The high-minus-low portfolio (H−L AC) is long in the high AC quintile and short in the low AC portfolio. Portfolio returns are
computed over the period from July of year t to June of year t+1. The portfolios are rebalanced at the end of each June. Excess return (r) is the diﬀerence
between portfolio returns and the one-month Treasury bill rate. The CAPM alphas (α) and Fama-French alphas (αFF) are the intercepts from regressing
portfolio excess returns on the market factor and the three Fama-French factors, respectively. The superscript ew denotes equal-weighted returns and vw
denotes value-weighted returns. The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations.
Panel A: Subsamples by payout ratio Panel B: Subsamples by bond rating Panel C: Subsamples by the WW index


























Low 1.43 0.76 0.42 0.71 -0.04 0.08 1.17 0.61 0.36 0.49 −0.01 0.11 0.85 0.16 −0.09 0.63 −0.04 0.10
2 1.29 0.66 0.35 0.57 −0.14 0.04 0.99 0.47 0.22 0.46 0.02 0.03 1.01 0.39 0.14 0.64 0.07 0.08
3 1.08 0.45 0.13 0.54 −0.17 −0.07 0.96 0.45 0.19 0.60 0.14 0.17 0.67 0.14 −0.24 0.53 0.03 −0.10
4 1.01 0.35 0.08 0.63 −0.12 0.03 0.91 0.38 0.19 0.42 −0.04 0.05 0.67 0.08 −0.27 0.53 −0.05 −0.11
High 0.64 −0.05 −0.32 0.24 −0.53 −0.37 0.87 0.26 0.07 0.28 −0.30 −0.09 0.66 −0.05 −0.30 0.46 −0.26 −0.16
H−L AC −0.79 −0.82 −0.75 −0.47 −0.49 −0.46 −0.30 −0.35 −0.29 −0.21 −0.29 −0.20 −0.26 −0.27 −0.25 −0.25 −0.29 −0.26
tH−L −6.12 −6.46 −5.74 −2.17 −2.30 −2.01 −3.25 −4.01 −3.13 −1.52 −2.16 −1.49 −2.93 −3.05 −2.65 −1.68 −1.89 −1.62


























Low 1.02 0.55 0.24 0.44 −0.02 0.05 1.21 0.64 0.30 0.37 −0.21 −0.22 1.76 1.01 0.68 0.43 −0.49 −0.49
2 0.88 0.43 0.14 0.57 0.14 0.09 1.13 0.63 0.29 0.39 −0.13 −0.16 1.73 1.09 0.90 0.82 0.01 0.04
3 0.83 0.37 0.06 0.59 0.14 0.10 0.93 0.42 0.05 0.39 −0.15 −0.22 1.46 0.80 0.52 0.70 −0.12 −0.10
4 0.78 0.32 0.03 0.43 0.00 0.01 0.83 0.29 −0.05 0.31 −0.27 −0.23 1.31 0.52 −0.12 0.58 −0.33 −0.72
High 0.68 0.17 −0.11 0.29 −0.21 −0.17 0.45 −0.14 −0.47 0.02 −0.61 −0.63 0.99 0.26 0.01 0.22 −0.66 −0.65
H−L AC −0.34 −0.37 −0.35 −0.15 −0.19 −0.23 −0.76 −0.78 −0.77 −0.35 −0.40 −0.41 −0.77 −0.75 −0.67 −0.21 −0.17 −0.17
tH−L −4.77 −5.47 −4.95 −1.05 −1.34 −1.53 −7.31 −7.80 −7.33 −2.12 −2.45 −2.43 −4.83 −4.83 −4.14 −0.99 −0.83 −0.75
Low-minus-high payout ratio Without-minus-with bond rating High-minus-low WW
H−L AC −0.45 −0.45 −0.40 −0.32 −0.30 −0.23 −0.46 −0.43 −0.48 −0.14 −0.11 −0.21 −0.51 −0.48 −0.42 0.04 0.12 0.09
tH−L −3.49 −3.47 −2.98 −1.39 −1.31 −0.95 −4.62 −4.39 −4.99 −0.83 −0.67 −1.25 −3.19 −3.05 −2.59 0.17 0.49 0.38
3
4Table 5 : The Asset Growth, Net Stock Issues, and Accrual Eﬀects Across Subsamples Split by O-score (July 1963–December
2006, 534 Months)
At the end of June of year t, we ﬁrst split the sample into three equal-numbered subsamples by O-score measured in ﬁscal year ending in calendar year t−1. The
deﬁnition of O-score is described in Section 3. Within each subsample, ﬁrms are sorted into ﬁve equal-numbered portfolios based on asset growth (AG, Panel
A), net stock issues (NS, Panel B), and accruals (AC, Panel C). AG is deﬁned as the change in total assets divided by lagged total assets. NS is the change in
the natural logarithms of the number of shares outstanding adjusted for splits to capture the eﬀect of share repurchases and seasoned equity oﬀerings. AC is
the changes in non-cash working capital minus depreciation expense scaled by average total assets in the recent two years. Portfolio returns are computed over
the period from July of year t to June of year t+1. The portfolios are rebalanced at the end of each June. Excess return (r) is the diﬀerence between portfolio
returns and the one-month Treasury bill rate. The CAPM alphas (α) and Fama-French alphas (αFF) are the intercepts from regressing portfolio excess returns
on the market factor and the three Fama-French factors, respectively. The superscript ew denotes equal-weighted returns and vw denotes value-weighted
returns. The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations.
Panel A: Asset growth (AG) Panel B: Net stock issues (NS) Panel C: Accruals (AC)


























Low 1.03 0.55 0.25 0.68 0.24 0.10 1.03 0.57 0.29 0.71 0.27 0.21 0.97 0.46 0.32 0.44 −0.07 0.14
2 0.88 0.42 0.19 0.44 0.03 0.00 0.79 0.35 0.07 0.40 −0.01 −0.02 0.80 0.31 0.13 0.52 0.08 0.10
3 0.82 0.32 0.17 0.49 0.06 0.08 0.83 0.31 0.17 0.54 0.06 0.19 0.82 0.32 0.16 0.54 0.08 0.20
4 0.76 0.21 0.13 0.52 0.01 0.26 0.83 0.25 0.22 0.58 0.04 0.28 0.78 0.24 0.17 0.34 −0.16 0.03
High 0.43 −0.25 −0.20 0.33 −0.28 0.10 0.40 −0.25 −0.23 0.17 −0.36 −0.16 0.55 −0.07 −0.18 0.27 −0.34 −0.09
H−L −0.60 −0.80 −0.45 −0.34 −0.52 0.00 −0.63 −0.83 −0.52 −0.53 −0.64 −0.37 −0.42 −0.53 −0.50 −0.16 −0.28 −0.22
tH−L −4.32 −6.82 −4.64 −1.83 −3.00 0.00 −4.31 −6.76 −5.12 −3.85 −4.74 −3.08 −4.18 −5.94 −5.50 −0.96 −1.70 −1.39


























Low 1.83 1.17 0.81 0.60 −0.09 −0.26 1.58 1.07 0.63 0.73 0.22 −0.17 1.59 0.93 0.57 0.60 −0.14 −0.19
2 1.40 0.86 0.55 0.67 0.10 −0.03 1.25 0.72 0.28 0.52 0.03 −0.27 1.30 0.72 0.36 0.48 −0.17 −0.26
3 1.11 0.60 0.25 0.60 0.11 −0.12 1.18 0.59 0.29 0.53 −0.07 −0.18 1.19 0.61 0.22 0.53 −0.08 −0.30
4 0.81 0.26 −0.08 0.44 −0.15 −0.25 0.93 0.28 0.05 0.50 −0.17 −0.17 1.02 0.42 0.05 0.43 −0.20 −0.42
High 0.35 −0.30 −0.56 0.02 −0.65 −0.74 0.60 −0.07 −0.26 −0.05 −0.70 −0.74 0.81 0.17 −0.16 0.23 −0.45 −0.62
H−L −1.48 −1.47 −1.37 −0.58 −0.57 −0.48 −0.98 −1.14 −0.89 −0.77 −0.92 −0.57 −0.78 −0.76 −0.73 −0.36 −0.31 −0.43
tH−L −8.05 −8.16 −7.67 −2.85 −2.80 −2.27 −5.53 −6.84 −5.78 −3.56 −4.38 −3.04 −5.54 −5.48 −5.53 −1.51 −1.32 −1.65
High-minus-low O-score High-minus-low O-score High-minus-low O-score
H−L −0.88 −0.67 −0.92 −0.24 −0.05 −0.48 −0.35 −0.31 −0.37 −0.24 −0.28 −0.20 −0.36 −0.23 −0.23 −0.20 −0.03 −0.21
tH−L −3.96 −3.31 −5.08 −0.85 −0.17 −1.94 −2.51 −2.25 −2.55 −1.15 −1.40 −0.98 −2.14 −1.43 −1.67 −0.78 −0.13 −0.79
3
5Table 6 : The Asset Growth, Net Stock Issues, and Accrual Eﬀects Across Subsamples Split
by Payout Ratio/Bond Rating/the Whited-Wu (WW) Index and O-Score
On June 30 of year t, we split the sample into six subsamples by an independent three-by-two sort on payout ratio
and O-score (Panel A) and on the WW index and O-score (Panel C). In Panel B, we split the sample into four
subsamples by an independent two-by-two sort on bond rating and O-score. The sort on bond rating categorizes
ﬁrms into two groups: the constrained group containing the ﬁrms with debt outstanding but without a bond rating
and the unconstrained group containing the ﬁrms whose bonds are rated. All the sorting variables are measured in
ﬁscal year ending in calendar year t−1. The deﬁnition of O-score is described in Section 3. Within each subsample,
ﬁrms are further sorted into ﬁve equal-numbered portfolios based on asset growth (AG), net stock issues (NS), and
accruals (AC). Portfolio returns are computed over the period from July of year t to June of year t+1. The portfolios
are rebalanced at the end of each June. Excess return (r) is the diﬀerence between portfolio returns and the one-
month T-bill rate. The CAPM alphas (α) and Fama-French alphas (αFF) are the intercepts from regressing portfolio
excess returns on the market factor and the Fama-French factors, respectively. The superscripts ew and vw denote
equal-weighted and value-weighted returns, respectively. Statistics signiﬁcant at the 5% level are denoted with
⋆.






















⋆ −0.39 −0.49 −0.31 −0.87
⋆ −0.88
⋆ −0.80
⋆ −0.46 −0.43 −0.39
H−L NS −0.27 −0.40








⋆ −0.27 −0.30 −0.31 −0.39
⋆ −0.35 −0.31 −0.21 −0.17 −0.16
Low payout ratio/high-minus-low O-score High payout ratio/high-minus-low O-score
H−L AG −0.50
⋆ −0.29 −0.52
⋆ −0.25 −0.08 −0.40 −0.32
⋆ −0.26
⋆ −0.36
⋆ −0.18 −0.14 −0.32
H−L NS −0.25 −0.22 −0.27 −0.41 −0.29 −0.34 −0.06 +0.03 +0.01 −0.10 −0.04 −0.18
H−L AC −0.22 −0.11 −0.17 −0.24 −0.11 −0.10 −0.21 −0.19 −0.25 −0.30 −0.24 −0.24
















































⋆ −0.30 −0.27 −0.34 −0.54
⋆ −0.55
⋆ −0.64
⋆ −0.13 −0.15 −0.20




⋆ −0.05 +0.09 −0.29 −0.64
⋆ −0.45
⋆ −0.67
⋆ −0.38 −0.21 −0.48
H−L NS −0.08 −0.03 −0.02 −0.09 −0.08 −0.11 −0.18 −0.16 −0.21 −0.22 −0.20 −0.15
H−L AC −0.21 −0.09 −0.11 −0.32 −0.17 −0.28 −0.34
⋆ −0.25 −0.33
⋆ −0.16 −0.04 −0.14








































H−L AC −0.30 −0.35 −0.32 −0.34 −0.34 −0.33 −0.52
⋆ −0.55
⋆ −0.44 +0.25 +0.25 +0.40
Low WW/high-minus-low O-score High WW/high-minus-low O-score
H−L AG −0.30 −0.17 −0.37
⋆ −0.13 −0.09 −0.40 −0.62
⋆ −0.37 −0.38 +0.20 +0.39 +0.60
H−L NS −0.20 −0.11 −0.14 −0.23 −0.23 −0.17 −0.30 −0.28 −0.15 −0.29 −0.29 +0.01
H−L AC −0.02 +0.13 +0.05 −0.09 +0.05 −0.23 −0.24 −0.07 −0.07 +0.50 +0.63 +0.51
36Table 7 : The Asset Growth, Net Stock Issues, and Accrual Eﬀects Across Subsamples Split by Trading Volume (July
1976–December 2006, 378 Months)
At the end of June of year t, we ﬁrst split the sample into three equal-numbered subsamples by trading volume. The trading volume is the annual volume
of trade in a ﬁrm’s shares from July 1 of year t−1 to June 30 of year t in millions of dollars from CRSP. Within each subsample, ﬁrms are sorted into ﬁve
equal-numbered portfolios based on asset growth (AG, Panel A), net stock issues (NS, Panel B), and accruals (AC, Panel C). AG is the change in total assets
divided by lagged total assets. NS is the change in the natural logarithms of the number of shares outstanding adjusted for splits to capture the eﬀect of
share repurchases and seasoned equity oﬀerings. AC is the changes in non-cash working capital minus depreciation expense scaled by average total assets in
the recent two years. Portfolio returns are computed over the period from July of year t to June of year t+1. The portfolios are rebalanced at the end of
each June. Excess return (r) is the diﬀerence between portfolio returns and the one-month Treasury bill rate. The CAPM alphas (α) and Fama-French alphas
(αFF) are the intercepts from regressing portfolio excess returns on the market factor and the three Fama-French factors, respectively. The superscript ew
denotes equal-weighted returns and vw denotes value-weighted returns. The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations.
Panel A: Asset growth (AG) Panel B: Net stock issues (NS) Panel C: Accruals (AC)


























Low 2.33 1.66 1.05 1.41 0.77 0.25 1.68 1.17 0.61 1.29 0.80 0.29 2.03 1.42 0.78 1.29 0.71 0.18
2 1.79 1.26 0.69 1.19 0.68 0.16 1.73 1.20 0.61 1.23 0.75 0.31 1.81 1.28 0.73 1.33 0.85 0.40
3 1.55 1.04 0.50 1.12 0.65 0.21 1.78 1.17 0.51 1.20 0.66 0.13 1.46 0.94 0.40 0.92 0.46 0.01
4 1.35 0.82 0.28 1.21 0.72 0.32 1.56 0.95 0.48 1.18 0.60 0.21 1.51 0.95 0.41 1.14 0.63 0.21
High 1.13 0.56 0.01 0.75 0.23 −0.20 1.47 0.83 0.30 0.80 0.22 −0.17 1.30 0.71 0.18 0.90 0.34 −0.07
H−L −1.20 −1.10 −1.05 −0.66 −0.54 −0.45 −0.21 −0.34 −0.32 −0.49 −0.58 −0.46 −0.73 −0.71 −0.60 −0.39 −0.37 −0.25
tH−L −7.07 −6.73 −6.58 −3.90 −3.35 −2.81 −1.47 −2.49 −2.46 −3.16 −3.92 −3.15 −5.65 −5.58 −4.98 −3.00 −2.86 −1.90


























Low 0.88 0.17 −0.04 0.74 0.19 0.04 0.85 0.26 0.00 0.68 0.17 0.09 0.77 0.01 −0.02 0.62 0.02 0.16
2 0.77 0.14 −0.05 0.54 0.04 −0.02 0.69 0.06 −0.13 0.52 −0.01 0.02 0.75 0.08 −0.05 0.55 0.01 0.04
3 0.73 0.08 −0.02 0.59 0.05 0.10 0.70 −0.01 −0.04 0.60 0.00 0.15 0.75 0.09 −0.07 0.65 0.10 0.10
4 0.60 −0.14 −0.10 0.60 −0.03 0.31 0.68 −0.13 −0.07 0.46 −0.23 0.03 0.58 −0.11 −0.16 0.40 −0.17 −0.06
High 0.17 −0.70 −0.59 0.26 −0.49 −0.23 0.23 −0.62 −0.55 0.32 −0.34 −0.25 0.30 −0.52 −0.51 0.27 −0.45 −0.20
H−L −0.72 −0.87 −0.55 −0.48 −0.68 −0.27 −0.62 −0.87 −0.55 −0.36 −0.51 −0.34 −0.47 −0.53 −0.49 −0.35 −0.46 −0.36
tH−L −5.01 −6.50 −4.78 −2.83 −4.28 −2.05 −3.36 −5.39 −4.36 −2.59 −3.98 −3.01 −4.40 −5.16 −4.40 −2.56 −3.53 −2.66
Low-minus-high volume Low-minus-high volume Low-minus-high volume
H−L −0.48 −0.23 −0.50 −0.18 0.14 −0.18 0.40 0.53 0.23 −0.13 −0.07 −0.12 −0.26 −0.18 −0.11 −0.04 0.09 0.11
tH−L −2.15 −1.11 −2.84 −0.71 0.60 −0.90 2.43 3.35 1.59 −0.76 −0.45 −0.66 −1.73 −1.25 −0.78 −0.22 0.58 0.64
3
7Table 8 : The Asset Growth, Net Stock Issues, and Accrual Eﬀects Across Subsamples Split by Idiosyncratic Volatility (IV OL)
(July 1976–December 2006, 378 Months)
At the end of June of year t, we ﬁrst split the sample into three equal-numbered subsamples by IV OL. IV OL is the volatility of the residuals from regressing
daily returns of a stock on the value-weighted market index over a maximum of 250 days ending on June 30 of year t. Within each subsample, ﬁrms are sorted
into ﬁve equal-numbered portfolios based on asset growth (AG, Panel A), net stock issues (NS, Panel B), and accruals (AC, Panel C). AG is the change in
total assets divided by lagged total assets. NS is the change in the natural logarithms of the number of shares outstanding adjusted for splits to capture the
eﬀect of share repurchases and seasoned equity oﬀerings. AC is the changes in non-cash working capital minus depreciation expense scaled by average total
assets in the recent two years. Portfolio returns are computed over the period from July of year t to June of year t+1. The portfolios are rebalanced at the
end of each June. Excess return (r) is the diﬀerence between portfolio returns and the one-month Treasury bill rate. The CAPM alphas (α) and Fama-French
alphas (αFF) are the intercepts from regressing portfolio excess returns on the market factor and the three Fama-French factors, respectively. The superscript
ew denotes equal-weighted returns and vw denotes value-weighted returns. The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations.
Panel A: Asset growth (AG) Panel B: Net stock issues (NS) Panel C: Accruals (AC)


























Low 0.81 0.41 0.05 0.66 0.22 0.04 0.95 0.55 0.23 0.73 0.31 0.16 0.82 0.40 0.14 0.48 0.01 0.12
2 0.81 0.41 0.11 0.51 0.10 0.04 0.76 0.37 0.07 0.51 0.09 0.06 0.80 0.38 0.11 0.55 0.12 0.09
3 0.73 0.30 0.05 0.47 0.04 −0.02 0.70 0.28 0.01 0.54 0.11 0.10 0.76 0.33 0.04 0.56 0.11 0.08
4 0.71 0.25 0.05 0.55 0.09 0.18 0.75 0.28 0.07 0.56 0.08 0.15 0.68 0.23 −0.01 0.40 −0.05 0.01
High 0.59 0.10 −0.08 0.47 −0.07 0.19 0.49 −0.01 −0.20 0.33 −0.19 −0.08 0.60 0.14 −0.10 0.36 −0.16 −0.03
H−L −0.22 −0.31 −0.13 −0.18 −0.29 0.15 −0.46 −0.56 −0.43 −0.40 −0.50 −0.24 −0.22 −0.26 −0.24 −0.12 −0.16 −0.15
tH−L −2.79 −4.35 −2.08 −1.20 −1.94 1.17 −6.10 −8.64 −7.06 −3.40 −4.35 −2.43 −3.44 −4.11 −3.72 −0.92 −1.26 −1.17


























Low 2.01 1.32 0.91 0.74 −0.02 −0.22 1.63 1.05 0.59 0.85 0.17 −0.18 1.66 0.96 0.62 0.30 −0.48 −0.57
2 1.75 1.12 0.74 0.85 0.15 0.03 1.70 1.09 0.68 0.72 0.01 −0.12 1.42 0.78 0.44 0.57 −0.20 −0.28
3 1.39 0.75 0.40 0.63 −0.11 −0.22 1.35 0.66 0.39 0.55 −0.23 −0.22 1.31 0.67 0.34 0.46 −0.31 −0.32
4 0.96 0.29 0.00 0.54 −0.25 −0.17 0.97 0.23 0.00 0.24 −0.59 −0.55 1.16 0.49 0.15 0.34 −0.45 −0.42
High 0.28 −0.48 −0.68 −0.34 −1.20 −1.15 0.66 −0.08 −0.29 −0.22 −1.06 −0.97 0.81 0.10 −0.19 0.08 −0.75 −0.73
H−L −1.73 −1.79 −1.59 −1.08 −1.18 −0.93 −0.97 −1.13 −0.89 −1.07 −1.22 −0.78 −0.85 −0.86 −0.81 −0.22 −0.27 −0.16
tH−L −9.60 −10.14 −8.93 −5.07 −5.63 −4.34 −5.74 −7.31 −6.13 −4.32 −5.10 −3.46 −5.62 −5.88 −5.73 −0.96 −1.19 −0.67
High-minus-low IV OL High-minus-low IV OL High-minus-low IV OL
H−L −1.51 −1.48 −1.46 −0.90 −0.89 −1.08 −0.51 −0.57 −0.46 −0.67 −0.72 −0.54 −0.63 −0.60 −0.57 −0.10 −0.11 −0.01
tH−L −8.44 −8.39 −8.18 −3.68 −3.66 −4.36 −3.32 −3.80 −3.07 −2.68 −2.96 −2.17 −4.03 −3.98 −4.01 −0.41 −0.42 −0.05
3
8Table 9 : The Asset Growth, Net Stock Issues, and Accrual Eﬀects Across Subsamples Split
by Payout Ratio/Bond Rating/the Whited-Wu (WW) Index and Trading Volume
On June 30 of year t, we split the sample into six subsamples by an independent three-by-two sort on payout ratio
and trading volume (Panel A) and on the WW index and trading volume (Panel C). In Panel B, we split the sample
into four subsamples by an independent two-by-two sort on bond rating and trading volume. The sort on bond rating
categorizes ﬁrms into two groups: the constrained group containing the ﬁrms with debt outstanding but without
a bond rating and the unconstrained group containing the ﬁrms whose bonds are rated. All the sorting variables
are measured in ﬁscal year ending in calendar year t−1. The trading volume is the annual volume of trade in a
ﬁrm’s shares from July 1 of year t−1 to June 30 of year t in millions of dollars from CRSP. Within each subsample,
ﬁrms are further sorted into ﬁve equal-numbered portfolios based on asset growth (AG), net stock issues (NS), and
accruals (AC). Portfolio returns are computed over the period from July of year t to June of year t+1. The portfolios
are rebalanced at the end of each June. Excess return (r) is the diﬀerence between portfolio returns and the one-
month T-bill rate. The CAPM alphas (α) and Fama-French alphas (αFF) are the intercepts from regressing portfolio
excess returns on the market factor and the Fama-French factors, respectively. The superscripts ew and vw denote
equal-weighted and value-weighted returns, respectively. Statistics signiﬁcant at the 5% level are denoted with
⋆.






















⋆ −0.02 −0.01 −0.00 −0.79
⋆ −0.81
⋆ −0.75
⋆ −0.47 −0.51 −0.47









⋆ −0.29 −0.23 −0.20 −0.39
⋆ −0.37
⋆ −0.35 −0.41 −0.40 −0.33
Low payout ratio/low-minus-high volume High payout ratio/low-minus-high volume
H−L AG −0.29 −0.15 −0.31 +0.20 +0.40 +0.10 −0.38
⋆ −0.28
⋆ −0.34




⋆ +0.36 +0.44 +0.55
⋆ +0.28 −0.06 −0.05 −0.03 −0.16 −0.07 −0.09
H−L AC −0.29 −0.24 −0.17 +0.18 +0.24 +0.22 −0.16 −0.15 −0.11 +0.06 +0.07 +0.09







































H−L AC −0.34 −0.33 −0.41
⋆ −0.25 −0.25 −0.25 −0.32
⋆ −0.27
⋆ −0.45
⋆ −0.24 −0.22 −0.37
With bond rating/low-minus-high volume Without bond rating/low-minus-high volume
H−L AG −0.21 −0.05 −0.23 +0.40 +0.62
⋆ +0.22 −0.17 −0.04 −0.15 +0.12 +0.34 −0.03
H−L NS +0.35
⋆ +0.37





H−L AC −0.19 −0.13 −0.11 +0.06 +0.14 +0.04 −0.21 −0.19 −0.08 +0.04 +0.11 +0.15






























⋆ −0.66 −0.68 −0.51
H−L AC −0.57
⋆ −0.48 −0.34 +0.04 +0.13 +0.23 −0.37 −0.19 −0.21 −0.49 −0.28 −0.36
Low WW/low-minus-high volume High WW/low-minus-high volume
H−L AG +0.13 +0.27 −0.16 +0.17 +0.35 −0.20 −0.11 −0.13 −0.34 +0.72 +0.74 +0.44
H−L NS +0.37 +0.48
⋆ +0.29 +0.12 +0.26 +0.12 +0.74
⋆ +0.67
⋆ +0.73
⋆ +0.47 +0.44 +0.25
H−L AC −0.04 −0.08 −0.14 +0.16 +0.13 −0.00 −0.24 −0.36 −0.23 +0.70 +0.55 +0.63
39Table 10 : The Asset Growth, Net Stock Issues, and Accrual Eﬀects Across Subsamples Split
by Payout Ratio/Bond Rating/the Whited-Wu (WW) Index and Idiosyncratic Volatility
(IV OL)
On June 30 of year t, we split the sample into six subsamples by an independent three-by-two sort on payout ratio and
IV OL (Panel A) and on the WW index and IV OL (Panel C). IV OL is the volatility of the residuals from regressing
daily returns of a stock on the value-weighted market portfolio returns over a maximum of 250 days ending on June
30 of year t. In Panel B, we split the sample into four subsamples by an independent two-by-two sort on bond rating
and IV OL. The sort on bond rating categorizes ﬁrms into two groups: the constrained group containing the ﬁrms
with debt outstanding but without a bond rating and the unconstrained group containing the ﬁrms whose bonds
are rated. The sorting variables are measured in ﬁscal year ending in calendar year t−1. Within each subsample,
ﬁrms are further sorted into ﬁve equal-numbered portfolios based on asset growth (AG), net stock issues (NS), and
accruals (AC). Portfolio returns are computed over the period from July of year t to June of year t+1. The portfolios
are rebalanced at the end of each June. Excess return (r) is the diﬀerence between portfolio returns and the one-
month T-bill rate. The CAPM alphas (α) and Fama-French alphas (αFF) are the intercepts from regressing portfolio
excess returns on the market factor and the Fama-French factors, respectively. The superscripts ew and vw denote
equal-weighted and value-weighted returns, respectively. Statistics signiﬁcant at the 5% level are denoted with
⋆.


















Low-minus-high payout ratio/low IV OL Low-minus-high payout ratio/high IV OL
H−L AG −0.27 −0.38
⋆ −0.19 −0.19 −0.27 −0.11 −0.44
⋆ −0.44
⋆ −0.37 +0.18 +0.21 +0.27
H−L NS −0.00 −0.22 −0.04 −0.28 −0.45 −0.18 −0.40 −0.45




⋆ −0.45 −0.44 −0.40 −0.13 −0.13 −0.10 +0.41 +0.40 +0.39





















H−L AC −0.02 +0.02 −0.01 +0.49 +0.45 +0.55 −0.41
⋆ −0.42
⋆ −0.40
⋆ −0.37 −0.39 −0.24




























H−L NS −0.11 −0.18 −0.16 −0.28 −0.38




⋆ −0.14 −0.14 −0.20 −0.54
⋆ −0.50
⋆ −0.65
⋆ −0.26 −0.24 −0.36




















H−L AC −0.22 −0.23 −0.11 −0.05 −0.04 +0.06 −0.44
⋆ −0.40
⋆ −0.45
⋆ −0.18 −0.13 −0.11


















High-minus-low WW/low IV OL High-minus-low WW/high IV OL
H−L AG +0.02 −0.01 +0.00 +0.27 +0.21 +0.07 −0.56 −0.40 −0.68 −0.21 −0.03 −0.32
H−L NS −0.39 −0.47
⋆ −0.46 −0.40 −0.53 −0.61 −0.15 −0.12 −0.14 −0.32 −0.26 −0.36
H−L AC −0.14 −0.18 −0.05 −0.66
⋆ −0.67
⋆ −0.65
⋆ −0.35 −0.31 −0.25 −0.02 +0.03 +0.09




⋆ −0.24 −0.27 −0.27 −1.60
⋆ −1.50
⋆ −1.32




⋆ −0.53 −0.68 −0.43 −0.13 −0.11 +0.20 −0.20 −0.09 +0.31




A.1 The Impact of Financial Constraints on the Investment-to-Assets and Net
Operating Assets Eﬀects
We measure investment-to-assets, I/A, as the change in property, plant, and equipment (Compustat
annual item 7) plus change in inventories (item 3) divided by lagged total assets (item 6), following
Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang (2008) and Chen and Zhang (2009). We use the change in property,
plant, and equipment to capture investment in long-lived assets for operations over many years
such as buildings, machinery, furniture, and other equipment. We use the change in inventories to
capture investment in short-lived assets within a normal operating cycle such as merchandise, raw
materials, supplies, and work in progress. Also, we have experimented with measuring investment-
to-assets as capital expenditure (item 128) divided by lagged net property, plant, and equipment
(item 8), following Xing (2008). The results are largely similar (not reported).
We measure net operating assets following Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004), who ﬁnd
that net operating assets (scaled by lagged total assets) is a strong negative predictor of stock
returns. We deﬁne the scaled net operating assets, denoted NOA, as (OAt − OLt)/TAt−1 in which
OAt is operating assets calculated as total assets (Compustat annual item 6) minus cash and short-
term investment (item 1). OLt is operating liabilities calculated as TAt − STDt − LTDt − MIt −
PSt − CEt, in which STDt is debt included in current liabilities (item 34), LTDt is long-term
debt (item 9), MIt is minority interests (item 38), PSt is preferred stocks (item 130), and CEt is
common equity (item 60). NOA is closely related to the comprehensive measure of accruals from
Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2005).
Without discussing the details, we note that from Tables A1 and A2 the impact of ﬁnancial
constraints on the investment-to-assets eﬀect and the net operating assets eﬀect are largely similar
to the impact on the asset growth eﬀect reported in Table 2.
A.2 Tests Using Failure Probability as a Measure of Financial Distress
The failure probability (F-prob) is from Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). We construct
F-prob following their paper (the third column in Table 4):
F−prob(t) = −9.164 − 20.264NIMTAAV Gt + 1.416TLMTAt − 7.129EXRETAV Gt












EXRETt−1 +     + φ11EXRETt−12
￿
41The coeﬃcient φ = 2−1/3, meaning that the weight is halved each quarter. NIMTA is net in-
come (COMPUSTAT quarterly item 69) divided by the sum of market equity and total liabilities
(item 54). The moving average NIMTAAV G is designed to capture the idea that a long his-
tory of losses is a better predictor of bankruptcy than one large quarterly loss in a single month.
EXRET ≡ log(1+Rit)−log(1+RS&P500,t) is the monthly log excess return on each ﬁrm’s equity
relative to the S&P 500 index. The moving average EXRETAV G is designed to capture the idea
that a sustained decline in stock market value is a better predictor of bankruptcy than a sudden
stock price decline in a single month. TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities divided by the sum of
market equity and total liabilities. SIGMA is the volatility of each ﬁrm’s daily stock return over
the past three months. RSIZE is the relative size of each ﬁrm measured as the log ratio of its
market equity to that of the S&P 500 index. CASHMTA, used to capture the liquidity position
of the ﬁrm, is the ratio of cash and short-term investments divided by the sum of market equity
and total liabilities. MB is the market-to-book equity. PRICE is the log price per share of the
ﬁrm. Because of the data limitation of total liabilities (Compustat quarterly item 54), the sample
period for the F-prob related tests is from July 1976 to December 2006.
Table A3 reports the asset growth, net stock issues, and accrual eﬀects across subsamples split
by the failure probability measure from Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). The results are
largely similar to those in Table 5. Table A4 uses failure probability to evaluate the robustness of
the horse race results reported in Table 6. The measures of ﬁnancial constraints have explanatory
power for the net stock issues eﬀect, and the explanatory power is largely comparable with that of
failure probability. A similar pattern also holds for the asset growth and accrual portfolios. In all,
the evidence suggests that the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints is distinct from that of ﬁnancial distress.
42Table A1 : The Investment-to-Assets Eﬀect Across Subsamples Split by Payout Ratio, Bond Rating, and the Whited-Wu
(WW) Index
In June of each year t, we split the sample into three equal-numbered subsamples by payout ratio (Panel A), two subsamples by bond ratings (Panel B), and
three equal-numbered subsamples by the WW index (Panel C), all measured at the end of ﬁscal year t−1. In Panels A and B, the sample is from July 1963 to
December 2006 (534 months). In Panel C, the sample is from July 1976 to December 2006 (378 months) because of the quarterly data limitation for long-term
debt in the construction of the WW index. Payout ratio is deﬁned as the sum of dividends and stock repurchase divided by operating income. In Panel B,
the constrained subsample contains all the ﬁrms with debt outstanding but without a bond rating, and the unconstrained subsample contains all the ﬁrms
whose bonds are rated. See Section 3 for details of constructing the WW index. Within each subsample, we sort ﬁrms into ﬁve equal-numbered portfolios
based on investment-to-assets (I/A) deﬁned as the sum of annual change in property, plant, and equipment (Compustat annual item 7) and annual change in
inventories (item 3) divided by lagged total assets (item 6). The high-minus-low portfolio (H−L I/A) is long in the high I/A portfolio and short in the low I/A
portfolio. Portfolio returns are computed from July of year t to June of year t+1. The portfolios are rebalanced at the end of each June. Excess return (r) is
the diﬀerence between portfolio returns and the one-month Treasury bill rate. The CAPM alphas (α) and Fama-French alphas (αFF) are the intercepts from
regressing portfolio excess returns on the market factor and the three Fama-French factors, respectively. The superscript ew denotes equal-weighted returns
and vw denotes value-weighted returns. The t-statistics, tH−L, are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations.
Panel A: Subsamples by payout ratio Panel B: Subsamples by bond rating Panel C: Subsamples by the WW index


























Low 1.52 0.90 0.47 0.74 0.03 −0.19 1.34 0.82 0.46 0.71 0.24 0.10 0.87 0.25 −0.14 0.66 0.07 −0.03
2 1.44 0.81 0.50 0.71 0.04 0.04 1.04 0.54 0.31 0.53 0.10 0.09 0.78 0.20 −0.08 0.64 0.08 0.10
3 1.14 0.49 0.23 0.73 0.01 0.08 0.90 0.41 0.21 0.42 0.02 0.03 0.80 0.24 −0.03 0.57 0.03 0.11
4 0.89 0.23 0.00 0.39 −0.34 −0.08 0.86 0.35 0.17 0.38 −0.09 0.05 0.69 0.08 −0.15 0.47 −0.19 −0.06
High 0.32 −0.37 −0.61 0.18 −0.58 −0.31 0.64 0.04 −0.16 0.38 −0.17 −0.04 0.48 −0.21 −0.44 0.40 −0.29 −0.16
H−L I/A −1.20 −1.27 −1.08 −0.57 −0.61 −0.12 −0.70 −0.78 −0.62 −0.33 −0.41 −0.14 −0.39 −0.46 −0.30 −0.26 −0.36 −0.13
tH−L −7.77 −8.41 −7.40 −2.72 −2.94 −0.62 −6.01 −6.91 −5.61 −2.64 −3.32 −1.22 −3.59 −4.18 −2.64 −1.84 −2.55 −0.92


























Low 1.15 0.68 0.31 0.74 0.28 0.10 1.40 0.86 0.45 0.59 0.06 −0.14 1.81 1.12 0.82 0.65 −0.14 −0.29
2 0.84 0.40 0.10 0.54 0.09 0.08 1.19 0.68 0.34 0.55 0.04 −0.07 1.82 1.14 0.91 0.70 −0.13 −0.13
3 0.77 0.35 0.10 0.46 0.07 0.05 0.94 0.43 0.13 0.43 −0.08 −0.10 1.49 0.80 0.62 0.62 −0.25 −0.25
4 0.74 0.31 0.05 0.43 0.00 0.03 0.73 0.19 −0.13 0.26 −0.29 −0.24 1.26 0.58 0.36 0.66 −0.19 −0.13
High 0.57 0.09 −0.22 0.43 −0.03 −0.02 0.29 −0.30 −0.64 −0.05 −0.69 −0.64 0.61 −0.08 −0.34 0.22 −0.64 −0.63
H−L I/A −0.58 −0.59 −0.53 −0.31 −0.31 −0.12 −1.11 −1.16 −1.09 −0.64 −0.75 −0.49 −1.20 −1.20 −1.15 −0.43 −0.50 −0.34
tH−L −7.90 −7.97 −7.26 −2.74 −2.70 −1.10 −10.18 −11.06 −10.33 −4.28 −5.05 −3.52 −7.06 −7.20 −6.90 −1.95 −2.26 −1.54
Low-minus-high payout ratio Without-minus-with bond rating High-minus-low WW
H−L I/A −0.62 −0.68 −0.55 −0.26 −0.30 −0.00 −0.41 −0.38 −0.47 −0.31 −0.34 −0.35 −0.81 −0.74 −0.85 −0.17 −0.14 −0.21
tH−L −3.88 −4.36 −3.64 −1.16 −1.33 −0.11 −4.33 −4.08 −5.16 −2.81 −3.10 −3.38 −4.52 −4.14 −4.80 −0.75 −0.63 −0.91
4
3Table A2 : The Net Operating Assets Eﬀect Across Subsamples Split by Payout Ratio, Bond Rating, and the Whited-Wu
(WW) Index
In June of each year t, we split the sample into three equal-numbered subsamples by payout ratio (Panel A), two subsamples by bond ratings (Panel B), and
three equal-numbered subsamples by the WW index (Panel C), all measured at the end of ﬁscal year t−1. In Panels A and B, the sample is from July 1963 to
December 2006 (534 months). In Panel C, the sample is from July 1976 to December 2006 (378 months) because of the quarterly data limitation for long-term
debt in the construction of the WW index. Payout ratio is deﬁned as the sum of dividends and stock repurchase divided by operating income. In Panel B, the
constrained subsample contains all the ﬁrms with debt outstanding but without a bond rating, and the unconstrained subsample contains all the ﬁrms whose
bonds are rated. See Section 3 for details of constructing the WW index. Within each subsample, we sort ﬁrms into ﬁve equal-numbered portfolios based on
net operating assets (NOA). See Appendix A.1 for detailed variable deﬁnition of NOA. The high-minus-low portfolio (H−L NOA) is long in the high NOA
portfolio and short in the low NOA portfolio. Portfolio returns are computed from July of year t to June of year t+1. The portfolios are rebalanced at the
end of each June. Excess return (r) is the diﬀerence between portfolio returns and the one-month Treasury bill rate. The CAPM alphas (α) and Fama-French
alphas (αFF) are the intercepts from regressing portfolio excess returns on the market factor and the three Fama-French factors, respectively. The superscript
ew denotes equal-weighted returns and vw denotes value-weighted returns. The t-statistics, tH−L, are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations.
Panel A: Subsamples by payout ratio Panel B: Subsamples by bond rating Panel C: Subsamples by the WW index


























Low 1.41 0.71 0.49 0.65 −0.09 0.04 1.29 0.72 0.63 0.53 0.00 0.26 0.95 0.28 0.11 0.74 0.10 0.25
2 1.42 0.75 0.44 0.83 0.09 0.17 1.09 0.55 0.32 0.55 0.10 0.16 0.88 0.29 −0.08 0.62 0.09 −0.03
3 1.28 0.65 0.29 0.63 −0.10 0.05 1.02 0.51 0.23 0.52 0.08 0.12 0.63 0.10 −0.15 0.45 −0.07 −0.04
4 0.95 0.34 0.02 0.54 −0.16 −0.03 0.86 0.34 0.05 0.35 −0.12 −0.12 0.87 0.26 −0.15 0.55 −0.06 −0.18
High 0.37 −0.30 −0.59 0.20 −0.55 −0.36 0.65 0.06 −0.19 0.30 −0.22 −0.14 0.53 −0.20 −0.48 0.39 −0.32 −0.27
H−L NOA −1.04 −1.01 −1.09 −0.45 −0.46 −0.41 −0.64 −0.66 −0.81 −0.22 −0.22 −0.40 −0.50 −0.54 −0.63 −0.44 −0.48 −0.53
tH−L −5.60 −5.58 −5.90 −2.01 −2.11 −1.76 −4.12 −4.34 −5.37 −1.69 −1.69 −2.95 −5.10 −5.59 −6.12 −3.60 −4.06 −4.05


























Low 1.02 0.53 0.34 0.59 0.11 0.23 1.25 0.65 0.41 0.43 −0.19 −0.09 1.90 1.08 0.89 0.63 −0.30 −0.23
2 0.95 0.48 0.20 0.51 0.07 0.09 1.21 0.68 0.33 0.56 0.04 −0.02 1.77 0.92 0.34 0.65 −0.33 −0.73
3 0.91 0.45 0.12 0.53 0.11 0.10 1.06 0.55 0.16 0.35 −0.16 −0.25 1.58 0.93 0.61 0.71 −0.10 −0.12
4 0.77 0.31 −0.03 0.43 −0.02 −0.11 0.76 0.26 −0.11 0.37 −0.15 −0.27 1.33 0.72 0.47 0.77 0.03 −0.04
High 0.55 0.07 −0.26 0.31 −0.12 −0.21 0.26 −0.30 −0.66 −0.19 −0.82 −0.79 0.65 0.00 −0.34 0.04 −0.75 −0.87
H−L NOA −0.47 −0.46 −0.60 −0.27 −0.23 −0.44 −0.99 −0.95 −1.07 −0.62 −0.63 −0.70 −1.25 −1.07 −1.23 −0.59 −0.46 −0.63
tH−L −6.15 −6.08 −8.00 −2.16 −1.84 −3.58 −6.42 −6.37 −7.14 −3.64 −3.77 −3.84 −4.84 −4.48 −5.21 −2.17 −1.75 −2.47
Low-minus-high payout ratio Without-minus-with bond rating High-minus-low WW
H−L NOA −0.57 −0.55 −0.49 −0.17 −0.23 0.04 −0.34 −0.28 −0.26 −0.40 −0.41 −0.30 −0.75 −0.54 −0.60 −0.15 0.03 −0.11
tH−L −3.29 −3.23 −2.76 −0.73 −0.98 0.15 −3.30 −2.81 −2.46 −2.14 −2.23 −1.54 −3.07 −2.40 −2.77 −0.52 0.10 −0.39
4
4Table A3 : The Asset Growth, Net Stock Issues, and Accrual Eﬀects Across Subsamples Split by Failure Probability (F-prob)
(July 1976–December 2006, 378 Months)
At the end of June of year t, we ﬁrst split the sample into three equal-numbered subsamples by F-prob measured in ﬁscal year ending in calendar year t−1. The
deﬁnition of F-prob is described in Section 3. Within each subsample, ﬁrms are sorted into ﬁve equal-numbered portfolios based on asset growth (AG, Panel
A), net stock issues (NS, Panel B), and accruals (AC, Panel C). AG is the change in total assets divided by lagged total assets. NS is the change in the natural
logarithms of the number of shares outstanding adjusted for splits to capture the eﬀect of share repurchases and seasoned equity oﬀerings. AC is the changes
in non-cash working capital minus depreciation expense scaled by average total assets in the recent two years. Portfolio returns are computed over the period
from July of year t to June of year t+1. The portfolios are rebalanced at the end of each June. Excess return (r) is the diﬀerence between portfolio returns
and the one-month Treasury bill rate. The CAPM alphas (α) and Fama-French alphas (αFF) are the intercepts from regressing portfolio excess returns on
the market factor and the three Fama-French factors, respectively. The superscript ew denotes equal-weighted returns and vw denotes value-weighted returns.
The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
Panel A: Asset growth (AG) Panel B: Net stock issues (NS) Panel C: Accruals (AC)


























Low 1.10 0.50 0.20 0.69 0.14 −0.01 1.04 0.52 0.22 0.82 0.30 0.27 1.01 0.35 0.10 0.53 −0.10 0.01
2 0.90 0.38 0.07 0.64 0.16 0.10 0.86 0.35 −0.03 0.59 0.10 0.00 0.96 0.36 0.10 0.58 0.04 0.00
3 0.87 0.31 0.08 0.52 −0.03 −0.06 0.86 0.25 0.01 0.43 −0.14 −0.14 0.84 0.24 0.00 0.60 0.04 0.07
4 0.88 0.23 0.04 0.64 0.03 0.21 0.88 0.19 0.03 0.63 −0.03 0.03 0.77 0.15 −0.07 0.36 −0.22 −0.16
High 0.41 −0.37 −0.52 0.31 −0.40 −0.29 0.52 −0.25 −0.37 0.24 −0.39 −0.36 0.66 −0.06 −0.28 0.32 −0.45 −0.31
H−L −0.69 −0.87 −0.71 −0.38 −0.54 −0.28 −0.52 −0.78 −0.59 −0.58 −0.69 −0.64 −0.35 −0.41 −0.38 −0.21 −0.35 −0.32
tH−L −5.11 −7.41 −5.96 −2.27 −3.43 −2.02 −2.93 −5.15 −4.45 −3.84 −4.65 −4.44 −3.63 −4.56 −4.05 −1.07 −1.84 −1.73


























Low 2.09 1.30 0.97 0.75 −0.10 −0.19 1.79 1.18 0.76 1.06 0.34 0.33 1.69 0.88 0.58 0.49 −0.37 −0.32
2 1.73 1.05 0.65 1.16 0.42 0.26 1.62 0.98 0.52 0.79 0.13 −0.16 1.46 0.77 0.45 0.48 −0.35 −0.39
3 1.42 0.77 0.41 0.95 0.27 0.07 1.28 0.54 0.27 0.88 0.15 0.11 1.35 0.66 0.31 0.75 0.00 0.08
4 1.02 0.34 0.02 0.54 −0.22 −0.07 1.15 0.33 0.13 0.61 −0.32 −0.11 1.17 0.45 0.15 0.74 −0.08 0.13
High 0.30 −0.53 −0.66 0.24 −0.65 −0.36 0.64 −0.18 −0.33 −0.02 −0.87 −0.69 0.86 0.08 −0.16 0.18 −0.77 −0.53
H−L −1.78 −1.83 −1.63 −0.51 −0.55 −0.16 −1.15 −1.35 −1.09 −1.08 −1.22 −1.01 −0.83 −0.81 −0.74 −0.32 −0.40 −0.21
tH−L −7.79 −8.22 −7.32 −1.83 −1.95 −0.59 −5.67 −7.04 −6.33 −3.89 −4.49 −3.55 −4.83 −4.83 −4.59 −1.12 −1.43 −0.71
High-minus-low F-prob High-minus-low F-prob High-minus-low F-prob
H−L −1.09 −0.96 −0.92 −0.13 −0.01 0.12 −0.63 −0.57 −0.50 −0.50 −0.53 −0.37 −0.48 −0.40 −0.36 −0.11 −0.05 0.12
tH−L −5.24 −4.87 −4.95 −0.43 −0.01 0.42 −4.21 −3.91 −3.22 −1.74 −1.86 −1.25 −2.49 −2.14 −2.03 −0.36 −0.15 0.34
4
5Table A4 : The Asset Growth, Net Stock Issues, and Accrual Eﬀects Across Subsamples
Split by Payout Ratio/Bond Rating/the Whited-Wu (WW) Index and Failure Probability
(F-prob) (July 1976–December 2006, 378 Months)
On June 30 of year t, we split the sample into six subsamples by an independent three-by-two sort on payout ratio
and F-prob (Panel A) and on the WW index and F-prob (Panel C). In Panel B, we split the sample into four
subsamples by an independent two-by-two sort on bond rating and F-prob. The sort on bond rating categorizes
ﬁrms into two groups: the constrained group containing the ﬁrms with debt outstanding but without a bond rating
and the unconstrained group containing the ﬁrms whose bonds are rated. All the sorting variables are measured in
ﬁscal year ending in calendar year t−1. The deﬁnition of F-prob is described in Section 3. Within each subsample,
ﬁrms are further sorted into ﬁve equal-numbered portfolios based on asset growth (AG), net stock issues (NS), and
accruals (AC). Portfolio returns are computed over the period from July of year t to June of year t+1. The portfolios
are rebalanced at the end of each June. Excess return (r) is the diﬀerence between portfolio returns and the one-
month T-bill rate. The CAPM alphas (α) and Fama-French alphas (αFF) are the intercepts from regressing portfolio
excess returns on the market factor and the Fama-French factors, respectively. The superscripts ew and vw denote
equal-weighted and value-weighted returns, respectively. Statistics signiﬁcant at the 5% level are denoted with
⋆.




























⋆ −0.02 +0.03 −0.04








⋆ −0.28 −0.28 −0.20 −0.32 −0.28 −0.15 −0.07 −0.14 −0.02
Low payout ratio/high-minus-low F-prob High payout ratio/high-minus-low F-prob
H−L AG −0.52








⋆ −0.11 −0.13 +0.06 −0.20 −0.23 −0.17 −0.31 −0.32 −0.07
H−L AC −0.14 −0.07 +0.11 +0.59 +0.56 +0.66 −0.22 −0.21 −0.19 +0.38 +0.41 +0.48































H−L NS −0.23 −0.31
⋆ −0.21 −0.46
⋆ −0.63








⋆ −0.15 −0.13 −0.27 −0.76
⋆ −0.71
⋆ −0.77
⋆ −0.36 −0.39 −0.44




⋆ −0.30 −0.28 −0.29 −0.79
⋆ −0.65
⋆ −0.69
⋆ −0.35 −0.17 −0.05
H−L NS −0.34
⋆ −0.31
⋆ −0.23 +0.03 −0.00 +0.11 −0.39
⋆ −0.36
⋆ −0.33 −0.32 −0.42 −0.18
H−L AC −0.06 −0.01 +0.09 +0.11 +0.20 +0.26 −0.39
⋆ −0.30 −0.19 −0.10 −0.06 +0.09






















⋆ −0.20 −0.08 −0.32 −1.06
⋆ −0.95
⋆ −1.18
⋆ −0.40 −0.22 −0.53








⋆ −0.37 −0.31 −0.14 −0.03 −0.06 −0.56
⋆ −0.55
⋆ −0.56
⋆ +0.00 +0.03 +0.00
Low WW/high-minus-low F-prob High WW/high-minus-low F-prob
H−L AG −0.43
⋆ −0.38
⋆ −0.26 −0.07 −0.13 +0.01 −0.40 −0.32 −0.23 −0.27 −0.27 −0.20






H−L AC −0.10 −0.04 +0.03 +0.08 +0.12 +0.26 −0.26 −0.22 −0.22 +0.22 +0.18 +0.32
46